Japanese Colonial Rule and Modernity: Successive Layers of Violence

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— translated from Japanese by Victor Koschmann

Memories of the Forgotten "Empire"

In August 1945, the Japanese government surrendered by accepting the Potsdam Declaration that had been issued by the Allied Powers. This declaration confirmed the basic line of the Cairo Declaration, which had called for the reversion of Taiwan to China and the independence of Korea, thereby returning the territory of Japan to the status quo ante, prior to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. In effect, therefore, it brought about the dissolution of Japan's colonial empire. As of August 1945, some 6,500,000 Japanese were residing in Japan's former colonial territories — Taiwan, Korea, plus various islands in Micronesia — and the occupied areas of China and Southeast Asia. Some 3,500,000 of these were civilians, serving as government officials, businessmen, agricultural emigrants, or in other capacities. Indeed, some 10% of the total Japanese population lived in the occupied area outside of Japan proper, a region referred to by Japanese as *gaichi* (outer territories, as opposed to the inner territories, or *naichi*, i.e., Japan proper). In postwar Japanese society, however, it has been unusual for those who returned from the *gaichi* to speak publicly about their prewar or wartime experiences in those areas. Although some have reminisced nostalgically in alumni gatherings and other relatively intimate contexts, it has been extremely rare for someone to reflect self-critically on his or her experiences as a colonist in front of others who did not share those

experiences. Overall, the colonial experience was thoroughly repressed, and in the process the event of forgetting was itself forgotten. Why did that occur? I'd like to explore the reasons for this phenomenon in three separate dimensions.

The most fundamental dimension of the problem is political. Even though the Allies, led by the United States, established the Far Eastern International Military Tribunal (Tokyo Trials) to demonstrate Japan's responsibility for military expansion from 1931 on, they did not seek to establish Japanese responsibility for Japan's colonial rule prior to that date. Of course, if we consider that at the time of the trials the United States was actually in the process of reestablishing its own colonial control over the Philippines, it becomes clear that the court's neglect of Japanese colonialism was less a matter of choice than of practical necessity. Moreover, Japan's relationship to the newly independent states that emerged in the formerly colonized and occupied areas was determined by Cold War strategy. In effect, therefore, in the postwar Japanese social structure and value system, issues related to postimperialism were immersed in the more salient processes of demilitarization and democratization; they were therefore neglected, and ultimately left "frozen" in an incomplete state.[1]

The second dimension relates to the consciousness of the participants in Japanese imperialism. Most former Japanese residents of the *gaichi* had experienced serious deprivation and other problems in the course of their repatriation, and those intense and bitter memories of repatriation tended to blot out any detailed recollection of the lives they formerly enjoyed as colonists. In the case of former soldiers, as well, memories of the rigors and mistreatment they experienced in the military interfere with their ability to confront the acts they committed. The "freezing" of the issues related to postimperialism at the political level allowed, indeed encouraged, individuals to "freeze" out their own memories of empire at the personal level.

Third is the dimension of intellectuals' responsibility. Most of the intellectual leaders of postwar Japan happily embraced the dismantling of the empire, and identified themselves with the construction of a democratized nation state. Very few expressed misgivings regarding the public's general failure to confront and deal critically with memories of "empire."

For example, in 1951 the leading postwar political scientist, Maruyama Masao, quoted Ernst Renan to the effect that modern nationalism should be founded upon a "daily plebiscite."[2] That is, in principle, each individual was obliged to

choose daily whether he or she chose to be "Japanese," and their choices could be effective only when the ideals of democracy held sway. But who should have the right to "vote" in these daily "plebiscites"? Maruyama never addressed that question even though meanwhile, in the world of realpolitik, Koreans and Taiwanese were first denied the right to vote in general elections and then, once the San Francisco peace treaty went into effect, lost their citizenship completely. There were very few exceptions. People who formerly were obliged by colonial policy to live in Japan were now unilaterally excluded in the course of reestablishing the Japanese nation state. Intellectuals like Maruyama failed to see the contradiction implied in the gap between these rude political realities and the ideal of autonomous choice expressed in the notion of a "daily plebiscite." Needless to say, they also failed to recognize the rights implicitly claimed by these peoples by virtue of their history of being colonized. Thus, the discourse of intellectuals also reaffirmed and legitimized forgetfulness regarding the legacy of empire.

Of course, there were exceptions. In 1948, Takeuchi Yoshimi, the scholarly specialist in the works of the Chinese writer, Lu Xun, cautioned against the contrasts commonly drawn between the "success" of Japan's Meiji Restoration and the "failure" of China's 1911 revolution, and argued that whereas Japanese had quickly forgotten their defeat at the hands of European culture and accepted it facilely, Chinese had not only resisted their own cultural defeat but mounted "resistance against any forgetfulness regarding that defeat."[3] Takeuchi suspected that amidst the postwar reforms Japanese were again preparing willfully to forget their defeat and change their stripes; he argued that an alternative to this type of superficial turnabout could be found only by learning from the experience of other Asians.

In Takeuchi's 1961 essay, "Nihon to Ajia" [Japan and Asia], he developed this motif as a critique of the "unilinear view of civilization" (*bunmei ichigenron*). According to Takeuchi, this conception of a "one-way street from barbarism to civilization" took root as the de facto state ideology in conjunction with colonization following the Sino-Japanese War. Moreover, Japanese had never experienced the kind of intellectual developments, including "proletarian thought," that would have led them to reject imperialism, which he understood as the "forcible imposition of civilization."

Why, then, was Japan, which modernized rapidly after internalizing the "unilinear view of civilization," prosecuted at the Tokyo tribunal as a "rebel against

civilization"? Takeuchi does not offer a very clear answer to this question, which he himself poses, but he does provide a way to approach it. He suggests that Japan was left out of the movement — which flourished in formerly colonized Asia — to "resist civilization and thereby help to reconstruct it." As an example of such resistance he recalls that, "when Gandhi took to the spinning wheel as a means of opposing the Lancashire textile factories, civilization increasingly found it impossible to punish such a rebellion against civilization." Yet "that change was invisible to the Japanese."[4] In the tones of a prophet who can perceive the future in such a seemingly insignificant event, Takeuchi writes that, "as American global policy is increasingly forced to protect pseudo-civilization, civilization itself will become increasingly devoid of principle and content;" in the meantime, however, the quickening of nationalism in Asia and Africa harbored a movement toward "the autonomous discovery of a more comprehensive value system."[5]

Takeuchi was most likely unaware of it, but in Algeria the same year, Franz Fanon wrote in *Wretched of the Earth*, "Let us decide not to intimidate Europe; let us combine our muscles and our brains in a new direction. The pretext of catching up must not be used to push man around, to tear him away from himself or from his privacy, to break and to kill him."[6] An effort to "resist civilization and thereby help to reconstruct it" was indeed emerging in Asia and Africa.

Although Takeuchi does not explicitly say so, he implies that Japan should have been tried as a rebel against civilization, not by the United States but rather by the peoples of Asia and Africa who were seeking to reconstruct civilization by resisting it. Nevertheless, the United States was in fact controlling the Tokyo trials. This subtle but decisively important fact allowed Japan to be exempted from prosecution for colonial rule and accelerated the onset of forgetfulness in postwar society regarding the legacy of "empire."

Even Takeuchi failed to address Japan's colonial rule concretely. Because he was preoccupied with the experiences of China and India, he made light of the fact that the Japanese "Asianists" who supported India's independence movement were also fervent nationalists who had ignored anti-Japanese movements in Taiwan and Korea. Nevertheless, his remark that the "unilinear view of civilization" provided the underlying ideology of colonial rule is worth reexamining, even in postwar Japanese society, and thus it is very important to rethink the relationship between colonial rule and modernity. The reason is that postwar Japanese forgetfulness is still half-unconsciously legitimated by a value system supporting

the belief that, like Europeans, the Japanese bestowed the "blessings of civilization" upon those they ruled and contributed to their modernization. The postwar Japanese government has also helped reproduce that value orientation by refusing legitimate demands for reparations from former colonies and occupied areas while at the same time presenting itself as eager to provide "aid" to formerly colonized "developing countries."

Major studies of Japanese colonial administration tend to stress how different it was from Western varieties. Japanese rule is considered unique because of its "assimilation policy," by which it imposed Japanese language and Japanese names, and enforced Shinto shrine worship.[7] Of course, in some ways Japanese policies differed irreducibly from Western equivalents. Nevertheless, it is necessary to recognize from the outset that Japanese colonial rule also occurred in the midst of the enormous transformations attending political and cultural modernization and the truly global diffusion of the capitalist mode of production. In effect, imperialistic colonialism was pursued as a joint project by Japan and the Western powers. Therefore, rather than constructing a balance sheet so as to tally up and "compare" the good and bad points of the Japanese and Western regimes, it is important to make clear that multiple imperialisms mutually reinforced and overlapped each other vertically, in a process that was thoroughly penetrated by violence.[8]

More concretely, it is essential to unify the Japan-Taiwan and Japan-Korean relationships, which are usually considered in terms of the history of colonial policy, with the Anglo-Japanese and Japanese-American relationships, which are usually considered only at the level of diplomatic history. In this essay, I will attempt to extract from the various combinations that might result the relations among Britain, Taiwan, and Japan. While focusing on the Christian missionaries who were sent from Britain to Taiwan on the occasion of the Opium War, I will also consider their relations with the Japanese who, following their victory in the Sino-Japanese War, were ascendant as the new imperial rulers in the "Far East," and the Chinese residents of Taiwan, who were gradually coming to see themselves as "Taiwanese."[9] The British missionaries in Taiwan do not necessarily represent the Western colonial administrations, but we can situate them historically by means of an investigation of their social and cultural background.

In the first section, I will take up the process by which, in the era leading up to the Japanese takeover of Taiwan following the Sino-Japanese War, pressure for

modernization penetrated Britain, China/Taiwan, and Japan, producing one "convert" to modern civilization after another and arranging them in a hierarchy of adaptation to the civilized order. While portraying in collage-like fashion several individuals who clearly manifested the qualities of such a "convert," I will attempt to reveal the "intertwined history" of Britain, China/Taiwan, and Japan. As Edward Said has suggested, "juxtaposing experiences with each other, letting them play off each other... [in order] to make concurrent those views and experiences that are ideologically and culturally closed to each other and that attempt to distance or suppress other views and experiences" is itself an important perspective in the study of imperialism.[10] It is precisely the work of parsing the threads of such "intertwined histories" that will allow the issue of responsibility for imperialistic colonialism to rise clearly to the surface.

While focusing on the relations between culture and imperialism, I will take up in the second section the history of the half-century following Japan's occupation of Taiwan. After clarifying the sense in which Taiwan has been designated a *colony*, I will use the microscopic case of the Tainan Presbyterian Middle School established by the British missionaries to show the process by which three orientations to modern education — British, Taiwanese, and Japanese — subtly differed, came into conflict, and finally generated a form of panic before bursting apart.

Areas needing to be problematized from the perspective of "culture and imperialism" are manifold, including literature, mass culture, architecture, and others, but in this essay I will focus especially on religion and education. Even in the modern world, religion continues to be an important dimension of the cultural realm. As Benedict Anderson points out in connection with the excellent example of the "tomb of the unknown soldier," far from a unilinear process of secularization, modernization is rather a process in which people's religious imagination is gradually absorbed by the modern nation state.[11] Religion becomes even more ideological than before, and ideology becomes religious. Moreover, rather than occurring in a self-sufficient manner within each nation state, modernization has developed as a process in which different cultures collide with each other, competing for hegemony. In the tense force-field that results, they have used violence to defend the illusion of their own culture's "purity" and fought to maintain cultural hegemony. Thus, in a manner of speaking, the objective of this essay is to join together and reconstitute the fragmentary vestiges of that violence.

"Converts" to Modern Civilization

The events that most vividly bore witness to the virtually seismic shifts that had transformed the face of 19th-century East Asia were the Opium War and the Sino-Japanese War. The Opium War began the dismantling of the classical community that comprised the Sinocentric empire, and the Sino-Japanese War completed the process. The inter-regional order that had formed through the mediation of the tribute trade system began to crumble in the late 19th century as a result of intrusions by the European powers and the United States; and the final link in the Sinocentric system of tribute trade — that with Korea — was dissolved by the Treaty of Shimonoseki that resulted from Japan's defeat of China. Japan's possession of Taiwan caused tremors in the balance of power system that had restrained the European powers and the United States, and opened the way for China's partition. Then, just at the turn of the century, the powers' (including Japan's) dispatch of troops to quell the Boxer Rebellion brought the final disintegration of the Sinocentric empire and signaled the establishment in East Asia of the modern imperialist system.

In the process, Japan rose to become the "military policeman of East Asia," and in that capacity contributed to the formation among the European powers of a system of "joint restraint." This was possible because the leaders of the Japanese government internalized the "white man's" perspective and disrupted the social order and value system of the existing society, striving instead to adapt to the order dictated by modern civilization. Those who feared the violence of the "white" overlord formed a "national subject" via the ordeal of "conversion" to modern civilization, and were themselves transformed into entities that exercised violence over subaltern others. In the course of this reversal, they took on a behavior pattern that combined cruelty toward others they viewed as uncivilized with coquetry toward the supposedly civilized. "Japanese" who shared this behavior pattern appeared in parallel with the Sino-Japanese War and Japan's takeover of Taiwan, and the importance of this pattern was self-consciously recognized by those in positions of power in the Japanese government.

The prime minister at the time of the Sino-Japanese War, Itô Hirobumi (1841–1909), said in a speech entitled "Administration following the Sino-Japanese War" that most residents of Taiwan were "ruffians from Guanzhou province and Fujian," and since this was a "half uncivilized" area whose residents included "aborigines,"

Japan should station there "sufficient troop strength" and use police to impose thorough-going control.[12] The same year as Itô's speech, Takano Môkyo, who had been appointed chief of the colonial administration's high court, reported in a letter to Itô that, "Among the natives arrested by our military or police forces, those deserving of the death penalty were hauled before the court and that evening taken out to the mountains or fields and executed. Their numbers were by no means small."[13] Itô's speech served to affirm and legitimize such a lawless situation.

On the other hand, in the midst of the Russo-Japanese War, Itô repeatedly appealed for the "sympathy of the civilized world," saying that "For the survival of the nation, especially in wartime, the sympathy of the civilized world is an extremely important, intangible form of support."[14] In the international politics of the time, when only a feeble form of restraint resulted from an untempered struggle for survival, Japan's hegemony over the East Asian world would have been impossible in the absence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902). In light of that, Itô's statements on the vital importance of the "sympathy of the civilized world" as a condition of Japan's survival in the international struggle for existence can be taken literally, as a serious statement indeed.

Those who fear violence are, at the same time, the ones who do violence to others. The position of the "Japanese" around the turn of the century aptly illustrates such ambivalence. However, it is also interesting to consider whether *some of* the British and Taiwanese, even if few in number, were not also "Japanese" in this sense. In other words, to the extent that there were among the British and Taiwanese those who actively promoted modernization, they must have included some who were forced to embrace the ambivalence of being simultaneously oppressor and oppressed.

Of course, by pointing that out I do not mean to argue that by virtue of their oppressor/oppressed ambivalence the British, Japanese, and Taiwanese necessarily all occupied equivalent positions. Such an over-generalization would dissolve all responsibility for domination. What I am getting at is not merely that they experienced a similar form of ambivalence, but also that as a result of differences in the timing of their adaptation to the order of civilization they came to be arranged in a political hierarchy, and out of the solidification of that hierarchy there emerged the regime of *colonial rule*. As Naoki Sakai has pointed out, modernity limits "the range of possibilities for thinking about the world historically and geopolitically;" by excluding the "possibility of coexistence between a

'premodern' West and a 'modern' non-West," it reinforces the imaginary identity of the West.[15] Therefore, in order to deconstruct that imaginary identity, it is necessary to be able to conceive of *some* British and Taiwanese also as "Japanese."

In order to consider this possibility, I will focus on three individuals. The first is Itô Hirobumi, already mentioned. The remaining two are Hugh M. Matheson (1821–1898) and Li Chun-shen (1838–1924).

Hugh Matheson was one of the managers of Matheson & Co., the London office of Jardine, Matheson & Co., which was famous in the opium trade. He was also the influential chairman of the East India-China Department of the London Chamber of Commerce, and served for more than thirty years as convener of the foreign missions committee of the Presbyterian Church of England, which dispatched missionaries to China's Fujian province and the southern part of Taiwan. As I will discuss below, when Itô Hirobumi traveled secretly to Britain in the late-Tokugawa period, Matheson served as his host.

Li Chun-shen was born into a poor household in Amoy, Fujian province. At the behest of his father, as a youth he was baptized a Christian. He cultivated his English ability at Ellis & Co. and other firms. When the business center of Amoy was destroyed in the mid-1860s as a result of the Taiping Rebellion, Li moved to Daidaocheng in Taipei and amassed a fortune in tea manufacture. Rather than resisting the modern transformation of East Asia, he was one who actively rode the waves of change. When Japan began its colonial administration, Li was among its active supporters, and in 1896 he was decorated by the Japanese government. The prime minister of Japan at the time was Itô Hirobumi.

Itô differed from the other two in his relationship to politics and evaluation of Christianity. Moreover, none of these men can be taken to "represent" the British, Japanese, or Taiwanese populations at the time. Matheson was little more than a parvenu in the eyes of English gentlemen. Itô was separated by a deep fissure of consciousness from the mass of the Japanese people who did not necessarily welcome "civilization and enlightenment;" and as a wealthy comprador, Li was isolated both from intellectuals who strove to preserve Chinese civilization and from ordinary Chinese. Indeed, the concept of "British" was multiply fissured from the beginning, and that of "Japanese" had only recently been manufactured; similarly, the term "Taiwanese" meant nothing more than a resident of Taiwan. These three men had in common only that, when modernization clattered over them like a falling line of dominos, they chose to hasten its advance. Of course,

the precise varieties of modernization each espoused differed significantly, but in order even to locate such differences we must first trace their backgrounds.

Victorian Parvenu: Hugh Matheson

Britain in the Victorian era (1837–1901) was dominated by the view that along with science and technology the main pillars of civilization were free trade, Christianity, and the Western way of life, and that these should be extended as widely as possible to the "uncivilized" peoples of the world. However, those who would be the agents of the "civilizing mission" might themselves have only recently emerged from the realm of so-called "barbarism." Take the case of Matheson: He was born in Edinburgh, former capital of Scotland, and his father was born in the northern region of Sutherland, so Hugh was raised at the cultural backbone of the Celtic fringe.

Scotland had been an independent kingdom, but in 1707 for most purposes it merged with England. It lost its own parliament, and the Presbyterian Church, which was the Established Church of Scotland, was reorganized according to the Episcopalian system of the Church of England. In other words, contrary to the Presbyterian principle that ministers should be appointed by a congregation that included laymen, now the right of the landowning class to appoint ministers was guaranteed.

Culturally, Scotland was divided into the lowlands, where English culture was strong, and the highlands which, like Ireland, belonged to the Celtic cultural sphere. In the highlands the peculiar pattern of social organization called the clan had developed, and Christianity did not penetrate very deeply. However, in the mid-18th century, an increasing number of clan headmen sent children to school in the lowlands and accepted Christianity; moreover, "Like many converts, they made the most zealous evangelists in attempting to convert their social inferiors to what they now regarded as civilization."[16] Then, from the late-18th to the early-19th centuries, a large-scale process of enclosure, called the Clearances, was carried out for the purpose of securing grazing land for sheep. As a result, most highlanders flowed into the urban slums, or migrated to North America. For example, the first missionary sent to Taiwan by the Canadian Presbyterian Church, G. L. MacKay, remarked, in explanation of his parents' emigration to Canada in the 1830s, that "There had been dark days in Scotland — the dark and gloomy

days of the 'Sutherlandshire Clearances,' when hundreds of tenant-farmers, whose fathers were born on the estate and shed their blood for its duke, were with their wives and families evicted."[17]

It was just another incident in the harsh advance of modernity. In Hugh Matheson's case, it appears that already in his grandfather's generation his family had begun to advance in the world via relatives as Presbyterian converts. Nevertheless, in his youth, Hugh's family spoke Gaelic and recalled their experience in the clearances. Hugh himself participated in the movement to preserve Gaelic and once declared that, "There is not a drop of blood in my veins that is not Highland."[18]

At age 15, Hugh joined a Glasgow firm and taught Sunday school in the church whose pews were the most expensive in the city. At that time, church pews were sold, and obtaining one at an expensive church was an indispensable means of attaining social respectability if one did not have prestigious bloodlines or educational credentials.[19] In 1843, Hugh experienced a remarkable incident. The Free Church of Scotland split from the Established Church and became independent in the course of the so-called Disruption. The main issue was distortion of Presbyterian principles since the Union with England. Included in the splitters' sense of "free," as in the Free Church of Scotland, was the ordinary sense of freedom from state rule. The supporters of this free church, including Hugh Matheson, were primarily from the middle class that had burgeoned in parallel with the rapid industrialization of Glasgow, and they were known for their belief in the orthodox Calvinist concept of predestination, along with hard work, frugality, educational achievement, and their zeal to spread the gospel overseas and among the poor. Armed with the doctrine of complementarity between laissez-faire and Christian morals, they rationalized social inequality in theological terms as the result of disparity between "those chosen by God" and the rest; "this theological rationalization of success and inequality prevented the rich and successful from feeling guilty about their wealth and success in the midst of the shocking misery and poverty about them."[20]

Perhaps the Scottish middle class was able to produce these aggressive proponents of the "capitalist ethos" because the "refined" cultural tradition of the English landed class had not accumulated there in sufficient depth. On the other hand, the rapid increase in Irish emigration as a result of the great famine of the 1840s led to prejudice and the circulation of stereotypes of the Irish as

"monkeys" and "drunks." This dichotomy between the Calvinists, who embodied the capitalist ethos, and the Irish, at the other extreme, represented an originary form of the binary of civilization vs. barbarism that soon spread across the world. Of course, when they appeared in the "Far East," they were regarded equally as "whites."

Scots were numerous in the vanguard of the British empire. Hugh Matheson's grandfather, James, was among them. James established Jardine, Matheson & Co. in cooperation with W. Jardine, and when the East India Company's monopoly over the China trade was abolished, Jardine, Matheson & Co. moved aggressively into the opium trade. Hugh's elder brother Donald and cousin Alexander were active in the business along with James, and in 1839 all three were ordered expelled from China by Lin Ze-xu. In 1843, the same year as the Disruption, James, who had returned to England to serve in Parliament in the ranks of the Liberal Party, urged Hugh to join Jardine, Matheson & Co. In light of the opposition to the opium trade that was gathering even within Britain, Hugh initially declined. Eventually, however, he was involved in managing Matheson & Co. Thus, beginning with his father's generation, Hugh represented a progression from Sutherland, the northernmost point on the British Isles, through Glasgow to London, the "center of civilization."

In 1844 in London, the Presbyterian Church of England was established around a central core of Scottish immigrants, and, using funds provided by Matheson & Co., the young church began to dispatch missionaries to China. It was, indeed, a matter of opium in the left hand and bible in the right. Such a structure seems fraught with contradiction, but as J. A. Mangan points out, "they had to construct bulwarks against a possible sense of guilt produced by disjunction between their colonial actions and domestic practices." Precisely because the immorality of the opium trade was clear, they needed some way to regain their confidence as agents of the "civilizing mission."[21]

The Tientsin Treaty (1858) that ended the second Opium War expanded the region in which missionaries could operate, even as an anti-Christian movement flourished. From the perspective of the educated gentry, the missionaries were destroyers of the received social order, and little more than barbarian intruders. Yet it was difficult to stop activities that were backed up by gunboat diplomacy. In the clash of civilizations between China and the West, the Chinese side lost. This became evident in the historical process leading to the 1898 Reform

Movement at the end of the century. In the late-1880s, Matheson wrote, "The opening of China to the commerce of the world, and her adoption, in a large degree, of Western ideas, in the defence of the country, and in the development of her material resources, signalise one of the most remarkable and most interesting changes of modern times" and it called for "profound gratitude to God."[22] Hugh Matheson's death in 1898 elicited condolence letters filled with remorse from Chinese who belonged to churches in Amoy and elsewhere.[23] In them, we find confirmation "in the words of Chinese themselves" of the victory of modern civilization as a victory of morality.

"One of the Matheson Boys" — Itô Hirobumi

Those who zealously "convert" to modern civilization on account of what is thought to be their barbarian origins never hesitate to impose that civilization on others. Not limited to Hugh Matheson, this behavior pattern is evident all over the world and was shared by Itô Hirobumi as well. At the same time, it is noteworthy that Itô accepted constitutional government and industrialization as the content of modern civilization, while considering Christianity to be irrelevant. Therefore, in his case the religious metaphor of "conversion" is indeed no more than metaphor.

Itô was born into a poor farmer's family in Chôshû domain at the end of the Tokugawa period, but because his father was adopted into the Itô household, the family had entered the very lowest stratum of the samurai class. In May 1863, at a time when Chôshû had just turned to a policy of "expelling Western barbarians" (*jôi*) and began firing on Western ships, Itô, along with Inoue Kaoru and three others, received the tacit approval of their feudal lord, the *daimyô*, to travel secretly to Britain. The idea was that in order to fight one's enemy one must first know him, and as the ship left Yokohama harbor, Itô wrote, "Suffering the shame of unmanly behavior, I go for the sake of the divine country."[24] Apparently, it was considered shameful to travel to a country of "Western barbarians."

The group of samurai, who had boarded a Jardine, Matheson & Co. ship in Yokohama, landed first in Shanghai. Itô's biography says that, "Surveying the scene from the ship's deck, they could make out warships, steamships, and sailing vessels passing frequently in and out of the harbor, and along the shore were rows of magnificent Western-style buildings and other sights. They marvelled at

this scene of prosperity." It also says that Inoue Kaoru rapidly changed his views in favor of opening the country to the West.[25] Their visit occurred toward the end of the Taiping Rebellion, just as General C. G. Gordon led the Ever-Victorious Army to victory against the Taipings, causing crowds of desperate refugees to stream into Shanghai. Itô and his shipmates must have encountered such tragic scenes even amidst the splendor of Shanghai, an urban show-window displaying the strength and appeal of modern civilization.

The travelers landed in London in September, and, according to the *Westminster Gazette*'s later account, "had the good fortune to be commended to the care of a Christian man of sturdy common-sense, a member of the firm which had arranged their escape — Mr. Hugh Matheson, to whose wise counsels and fatherly care Japan owes not a little today. 'Yes, I was one of Mr. Matheson's boys', said the Japanese Premier [Itô] to me the other night."[26]

Hugh Matheson not only took charge of Itô's personal well-being, but opened the way for the party of Japanese to study at the University of London's University College. Unlike Oxford and Cambridge, this school was open to those outside the Church of England, like the Presbyterians, and was willing to tailor its curriculum to offer natural sciences and foreign languages, while leaving out theology. Matheson's background, including his Scottish origins, conformed well to the desires of Itô and his party.

In March of the year following, news from Japan caused Itô hastily to return there and devote himself to persuading Chôshû to abandon its expulsionist policy and make peace with the European powers and the United States. Having directly experienced China's distress and Europe's wealth in close succession — what Matsuzawa Hiroaki defines as the "combined experience of China and the West"[27] — he had promptly become a "convert" to modern civilization.

In 1872, following the Meiji Restoration, Itô visited London again as a member of the Iwakura Mission. This time, he enlisted Hugh Matheson to help recruit faculty for the Imperial College of Engineering (later the College of Engineering of Tokyo Imperial University). Matheson consulted with the professors at the University of Glasgow, and negotiated on Itô's behalf with Henry Dyer.[28] Under Dyer's direction, the College of Engineering became a progressive, high quality institution of technical learning, and its products achieved rapid industrialization from above. Meiji Japan was thus able to defend itself against massive intrusions of foreign capital and grew into a state that behaved much like a large-scale trading company with its own military support.

Japan succeeded quite well in erecting a barrier against domination by foreign capital, but pell-mell introduction of modern civilization also caused confusion in the realms of religion and morals. In order to prevent negative reactions against modernization from turning into a full-scale "revolt against civilization," it was necessary to bring about a "mass conversion" to the civilized order that would include even those of Itô's generation who had no experience of Shanghai and London.

What was fashioned in place of Christianity to meet that political need was the pseudo-religion of the emperor system. In 1887, at the outset of deliberations on the draft Constitution, Itô Hirobumi emphasized that in the West, Christianity unified the minds of the people as the "axis" of the state and thus supported the Constitutional order, whereas in Japan, Buddhism was in "decline" and Shintô lacked the "power to guide the minds of the populace;" thus, "only the imperial household" was capable of constituting the state's "axis."[29]

Just as Itô planned, Article One of the Meiji Constitution (1889) announced that "The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal," thus appealing to the creation myths as the basis for imperial legitimacy. Despite the archaic aura in which the emperor was cloaked, this "invented tradition" was essentially an adaptation to modern civilization. In its essence, it had the characteristics of a new religion, offering this-worldly benefits. Emperor worship actually began to function effectively as a means of mobilizing mass consciousness after the Sino-Japanese War. During that war, the Emperor Meiji was ensconced in an imperial headquarters in Hiroshima so as to make it look like he was personally commanding Japan's military forces. This imperial performance was effective in disseminating the image of the emperor as a beneficent entity who brought home such "spoils of war" as monetary reparations and Taiwan.[30]

In the end, the Japanese government succeeded in warding off Europe and America in the realms of both industry and religion, and while appealing to the "sympathies of the civilized world," completed its adaptation to the modern order. The politician who consciously steered such a course, while sensitively comprehending trends in international politics, was Itô Hirobumi. Even Itô's comment that he was "one of Mr. Matheson's boys," was made during a newspaper interview in March 1895 in the midst of peace negotiations for the Shimonoseki treaty, and was calculated not only to excoriate the barbarism of the Ch'ing court,

which had obscured the locus of war responsibility, but also to pointedly inform the Chinese plenipotentiary, Li Hong-zhang, of Itô's knowledge of the West. In other words, the comment represented Itô's pride in keeping a step ahead in terms of modernization and his calculated appeal for British favor.

At the very moment the interview took place, a reaction was occurring in Britain against Japan's dominion over Taiwan, and there was even an effort by Matheson to buy Taiwan back within the syndicate headed by Jardine.[31] But although the Shimonoseki treaty's award of the Liaodong penninsula to Japan invited the Triple Intervention, Japan was able to gain the powers' understanding regarding its appropriation of Taiwan, and was able to avoid intervention by giving highest consideration to "sharing benefits" with the government and merchants of Britain via the most-favored nation provision. Jardine Matheson had already withdrawn from investment in Japan in the 1870s, but on the basis of the most-favored nation provision was now able effortlessly to obtain industrial rights in China and begin full-scale investment there.[32] Hugh Matheson's solicitous care of the young Itô Hirobumi had paid off handsomely.

In 1901, a series of articles in the *China Mail*, an English-language paper published in Hong Kong, criticized the monopoly over the sales of camphor and other goods exercised by the Japanese Government-General in Taiwan. W. C. Campbell, a missionary sent to Taiwan by the Presbyterian Church of England, took the Government-General's side, arguing that even though the monopoly disadvantaged certain Western merchants, it was not an egregious abuse of the "spoils of war." Moreover, in response to the proposal made by the author of the articles that pressure should be brought to bear on the British government by way of the London Chamber of Commerce, Campbell commented that, "those connected with such important Corporations, like our own Mission Convenor, the late Mr. Hugh M. Matheson of 3 Lombard Street, are also sensible men of honour, who believe in both sides of the 'live and let-live' principle."[33]

It is true to a certain extent that both British and Japanese adhered to a principle of "live and let-live." However, the effective scope of that principle was limited, and toward Chinese and Taiwanese it was more a matter of "joint oppression."

"Castaway" of the Qing Dynasty: Li Chun-shen

The residents of Taiwan had nothing to do with the decision that led to Japanese

rule over their island. This lack of consultation was legitimized by the view that political self-determination was appropriate only for "nationals" who had gone through the process of adaptation to a civilized order.

However, as they moved to occupy Taiwan the Japanese military were confronted with stubborn resistance by anti-Japanese guerrillas. Cruel suppression visited upon those viewed as guerrillas succeeded only in encouraging others to resist, contributing to a vicious circle. Kabayama Sukenori, the first governor-general of Taiwan, frankly expressed his uncertainty to Itô Hirobumi in a cable, which said that the "Righteous Army," which is what the anti-Japanese guerrillas called themselves, "frequent mountain roads, disrupt rail and power lines, and pounce upon villages, causing casualties among our troops." Therefore, he requested permission to delay the advance of Japanese forces southward toward the cities of Anping (Tainan) and Dagou (Takao).[34] In reply, Itô wrote that because, "Foreigners in Anping and Dagou are facing an emergency, and we are frequently subjected to inquiries even from the British government regarding the scheduling of our military operations," the troops should advance south no matter what, and Kabayama finally succeeded in occupying Tainan/Takao in November.[35] In this case, Itô consistently adhered to his policy of placing priority on "the sympathies of the civilized world."

Even several years later, the Government-General continued to worry over how to respond to anti-Japanese guerrillas, but it also benefited from the cooperation of certain powerful Han Chinese, and somehow succeeded in establishing the colonial administration on an even keel. One of those Han Chinese was Li Chun-shen. In July of 1895, Li successfully proposed that the Government-General establish a Bureau for Preserving Peace and Order (*horyôkyoku*). In a report to Itô, Kabayama wrote regarding the Bureau that, "We haven't had the time to gain a complete knowledge of the feelings, customs, etc., of the indigenous people, but even though we find administration here extremely difficult, it is fortunate that a wealthy merchant and others have established a Bureau for Preserving Peace and Order, and we have communicated our views on it, with the result that both colonial government and Japanese people rely upon it."[36] Also, the chief of the Civil Government Bureau, Mizuno Jun, made an award to Li and some others on account of "their frequent help in hunting for bandits," etc.[37] From this, it is clear that the Bureau also played an important role in rounding up anti-Japanese guerrillas, so Li also cooperated in the process of "joint oppression."

From Li's point of view, one can imagine that as a capitalist his highest priorities were "the preservation of order" and the security of his own assets. However, the Government-General had allowed a two-year period of grace during which colonials could decide on whether or not they wanted to take Japanese citizenship, so Li had the alternative of selling his assets and returning to the mainland. Why did he decide to become a Japanese "subject"?

One key to this issue can be found in his "travels to the East" of February 1896. Li was invited by Governor-General Kabayama to accompany him on a "triumphal return" to Japan proper (*naichi*). The *Tokyo asahi shinbun* introduced Li as follows:

> A rich merchant from Daidaocheng (outskirts of Taipei) who deals in tea and camphor, Li Chun-shen was one of the first of his countrymen to show goodwill toward the Government-General and has often exerted himself on behalf of our military forces. Brisk and alert in temperament, he is a master of Mandarin and nearly fluent in English as well. He turns sixty this year. He says that when he gets to Japan proper he intends to cut his pigtail and dress entirely like a Japanese.[38]

From Governor-General Kabayama's perspective, Li's journey "east" served, no doubt, to show off the civilized contours of Japan proper and impress him profoundly. The propaganda effect of demonstrating to ordinary people the successful subjugation of a "new subject" might also have entered into his calculation. Kabayama and his party were given a grand welcome, and met by an imperial messenger and Prime Minister Itô Hirobumi. The young man who, thirty-some years before, had stolen away on a ship to London, the center of civilization, could now welcome an important visitor to Tokyo, the new center of civilization in East Asia. In June of the same year, Itô visited Taiwan, and this time Li's congratulatory article was published on the front page of the *Taiwan shinpô* (later changed to the *Taiwan nichinichi shinpô*).[39]

Li's account of his visit to Japan proper, *Tôyû rokujûyonichi*, was serialized in *Taiwan shinpô*, and later published as a book in Fuzhou. In that account, he records how impressed he had been to find the various institutions of civilization, such as schools, factories, newspapers, etc., in completed form, but he also mentions the powerful influence of Christianity in Japan. As he understood it, in Japan — contrary to the situation under the Qing — there was now complete

"freedom of belief." Yet, as research by Huang Jun-jie and Ku Wei-ying has revealed, Li's itinerary was completely controlled by Japanese officials, and he could not observe situations in which Christianity had been suppressed.[40]

In his address at Azabu Church in Tokyo, Li introduced himself by saying, "I was born in Lujiang, and as a youth obeyed my father, had faith in God, and followed the teachings. After moving to the east (Taiwan) I obeyed my teacher, McKay (the Canadian Presbyterian missionary), followed the Way, and observed the rites." He then raised the question of why the small country of Japan had defeated the much larger Qing empire, and by way of an answer, suggested that in Japan, "government is lenient while customs have profound effect; people worship Jesus and clearly serve the Lord;" in Qing China, on the other hand, "government is anachronistic and the people are recalcitrant," so that "sovereign and people are of one mind in seeking to destroy the sacred faith."[41]

Li's comments were delivered in a Japanese church and must be evaluated in that context. Nevertheless, his beliefs that Christianity is the foundation of the strength and wealth of civilization and that the defeat of the Qing was determined by its persecution of that religion appear to be sincere, and based on his own experience. In the 1870s, missionaries in Taiwan worked out a division of labor in which Canadian Presbyterians began their proselytizing in the north and English Presbyterians took the south. Li became a central figure in the northern sector. However, his activities in conjunction with both missionaries and foreign business interests made him the object of considerable popular antipathy.[42] Thus, Li, who was isolated and vulnerable under Qing rule, had grounds for his charge that Qing "rule was anachronistic and the people recalcitrant."

Another possible reason why Li chose to become a Japanese subject was the shallowness of his identification with the Qing. Li was a resident of Taiwan on the periphery of the Qing empire and held no rank or title under the bureaucratic examination system. In this, he differed markedly from intelligentsia on the mainland, but was typical of his class in Taiwan. In the late Qing, the local elites in China, including landowners, merchants, landlords, and others, tended to arrange by various means to obtain titles as degree holders and thus to gentrify themselves, even though their social status depended less on cultural respect that on actual power, which was based on assets and private armies.[43]

For Li, it was most important to promote industry and spread Christianity, so as long as the new Japanese rulers were patrons of modernization, they were

acceptable to him. Clearly, he placed certain very optimistic expectations on the modern era, but, at the same time, it would be a mistake to conclude that he was simple minded.

Li was not only a prominent merchant, but an early introducer of modern thought to Taiwan. From the mid-1870s, he drew upon his profound knowledge of the international situation to contribute a number of opinion pieces to papers like Hong Kong's *Zhongwai xinpao* and Shanghai's *Wangkuo gongpao*. When Japan dispatched troops to Taiwan in 1874, he rang the alarm bells regarding an invasion, saying, "Those concerned about Ryûkyû (Okinawa) and Korea would be well advised to mount a defense at the earliest opportunity. We should never adhere tenaciously to established ways, or just sit and await a Japanese invasion."[44] At the same time, he argued for the necessity of expanding defenses, promoting industry, abolishing the traditional examination system, and propagating Western-style school education, and when the Western affairs movement occurred in the 1880s under the governorship of Liu Ming-zhuan, he offered his cooperation in constructing a modern infrastructure, including the railway from Taipei to Keelung. From Li's perspective, Japan constituted a threat, and at times even an outright enemy.

During his visit to Japan, Li was keenly conscious of being the "castaway of a defeated country." His most vivid ordeal occurred as he disembarked in Hiroshima and was called "Chankoro" — a disparaging epithet — by a Japanese child.[45] Indeed, only a policeman's intervention saved him from having a stone hurled in his direction, and the incident shocked him so profoundly that he cut off the pigtail that marked him as a subject of the Qing and changed to Western clothing. This is what lay behind the *Tokyo asahi shinbun* report that "when he gets to Japan proper he intends to cut his pigtail and dress entirely like a Japanese."

Moreover, when he went to see a performance of "Battles of the Sino-Japanese War" (*Nisshin suiriku sentô no gekî*) in Asakusa, he was unable to bear it so got up in the middle and left. As he reveals, the incident had a deep emotional impact: "Although my recently-acquired obligations toward the Japanese empire are profound, it is difficult to forget a debt to the Qing Dynasty. Although it is shameful to lose one's country, it was my decision to change nationality. At the same time, it was excruciating to see others enjoying those heart-rending scenes."[46] No doubt, the drama portrayed "peerlessly brave and loyal Japanese soldiers" cutting down "timid and fearful Chinese soldiers." Even though he was a

"castaway," Li clearly took pride in having chosen voluntarily to become a Japanese subject. Meanwhile, in the eyes of Japanese who were in a frenzy over their victory and admission into the club of "civilized nations," Li was just a "Chankoro."

After his return to Taiwan from his visit to Japan, he virtually stopped his commentary on current events, devoting himself instead to activities related to the dissemination of Christianity and education. He produced a series of books explaining Christian doctrine that were published in Fuzhou, and one can imagine that these publications embodied his fervent hope that the Chinese people under Qing rule would finally embrace Christianity.

In regard to education, it is noteworthy that when he traveled to Japan he gathered seven young men from among his grandchildren and relatives and requested that they be allowed to study for a period of time at Japanese schools. This clearly symbolizes the high expectations he placed on modern education under Japanese rule. Although his request was granted, it soon became clear that this was an exceptional case. Not too long after Li returned to Taiwan, the following article, entitled "The Education of Taiwanese," appeared in the *Tokyo asahi shinbun*:

> Even in the Ministry of Education there is an atmosphere of caution regarding the education of the people of that island. Some say that we should select outstanding students and educate them in Japan proper, but often when unenlightened people are rapidly imbued with a civilized education the results are contrary to intent. We have, in fact, educated Okinawans in Japan proper and spread an enlightened atmosphere among them, but in not a few cases they have advocated Ryukyuan independence and impeded provincial administration. Some argue that educating Taiwanese in Japan proper will produce similar results. Thus, the issue of temporary study (*ryûgaku*) requires further deliberation.[47]

It is difficult to confirm the facts behind the contention that students from the Ryûkyûs advocated "Ryukyuan independence." Nevertheless, it is true that Jahana Noboru, who went from Okinawa to Tokyo in 1882 as the first exchange student supported by the prefecture, returned to Okinawa as a higher civil servant after graduating from the College of Agriculture, Tokyo Imperial University and soon — just as the above newspaper article was published — became embroiled in a confrontation with the governor of Okinawa prefecture over official appropriation of land formerly held communally by farmers. Jahana, who resigned from the

government in 1898, subsequently devoted himself to the movement to obtain suffrage rights for Okinawans. Finally, he became deranged after failing to achieve his objectives and died in a fit of anger.[48]

What is important here is not the question of whether figures like Jahana actually advocated "independence for the Ryûkyûs," but the fact that their oppositional discourse was taken that way in the metropole. In its first part, the selection quoted above suggests that Taiwanese and Okinawans are "unenlightened" people so "civilized education" should not be imparted to them. However, the second part of the article makes it clear that this is merely the inverted expression of a hidden logic. That is, as we can see from the example of Jahana, there was concern that arguments made by Okinawans would "impede prefectural administration," hence "civilized education" of the sort that might encourage such arguments should be avoided. As a further extension of this logic, it was necessary to tag the Okinawans as "unenlightened" in order to legitimize such a policy. It is characteristic of this hidden logic for problems arising in the realm of political and economic conflict to be reduced to a matter of the civilizational level of a particular group — that is, to an attribute. In other words, education and culture were being mobilized in order to rigidify imaginary "natural differences." It was a logic admirably suited to the realities of *colonial rule*.

Most likely, Li was incapable of imagining the true nature of *colonial rule* under a regime of modern imperialism. In fact, at the juncture of 1896, the gap between Lee's expectations and those of the Japanese had only begun to emerge in the "Chankoro" incident and minor newspaper articles like the one above. Nevertheless, in parallel with the development of colonial rule, this gap was destined gradually to mature into bitter conflict.

The Construction of Colonial Rule

The first decade after Japan took possession of Taiwan was characterized by trial and error, as the Japanese gradually formulated colonial policy. "Castaways" of the Qing, like Li Chun-shen, were unable to participate in policy formation; it was clear, above all, that as the victors in war, Japan's government leaders were able unilaterally to determine policy, but even they had no blueprint for colonial rule. The two main sources upon which they based their policy decisions were the experience of governing Okinawa and the information that had been collected on colonial administration by the European powers and the United States.

One who played a major role in establishing the main institutions of rule over Taiwan was Gotô Shinpei, who in 1898 was appointed chief of the Civil Affairs Bureau and later, Director of Civil Administration (*Minsei chôkan*). In a memorandum he wrote around the time he was first appointed, Gotô said, "In an era of competition among nations, successful colonial administration seems to be a major factor in recent imperialist development;" and "In Taiwan, it will be difficult to apply the legal system of Japan proper; we must proceed with close attention to world trends."[49] The success or failure of colonial policy impacted on the "struggle for survival" among the imperial powers, and in order to succeed in that struggle, it was disadvantageous to be bound by the "legal system of Japan proper." Japan should seek a colonial policy that conformed to the "trends of the world."

As one who saw colonial policy as merely a part of diplomatic policy more broadly, Gotô felt it necessary to be attentive primarily to the perspective of the European powers and the United States rather than those of the people of Taiwan. The *Fifty Years of New Japan* (*Kaikoku 50-nen shi*), published in both Japanese and English, observed that "Experienced men of other countries, who had practical experience of the difficulties in governing a new territory, were inclined to predict that Japan would, like Sparta of old, certainly fail as a ruler in peace."[50] This was just when negotiations with the European powers and the U.S. were at the most crucial stage, and Gotô's colonial policy, including the elements focused on political administration, economics, education, etc., gave highest priority to meeting the skeptical gaze of the Europeans and Americans.

The same orientation is evident in Takekoshi Yosaburô's *Japanese Rule in Formosa* (*Taiwan tôchi shi*), published in 1905 in both English and Japanese, with a preface by Gotô. In his own preface, Takekoshi announced, "Western nations have long believed that on their shoulders alone rested the responsibility of colonizing the yet unopened portions of the globe, and extending to the inhabitants the benefits of civilisation: but now we Japanese, rising from the ocean in the extreme Orient, wish as a nation to take part in this great and glorious task."[51] While comparing the colonial systems of various nations, he explains the system of rule on Taiwan as follows: "The power vested in the Governor-General is similar to that held by the Governors of the British Crown Colonies, while, with regard to military matters, it more closely resembles that of French Colonial Governors."[52]

Takekoshi's observation regarding the Taiwan Government-General is not mistaken. Among the Japanese leaders there had been a debate regarding whether or not the colonial government should be granted comprehensive powers, free from the constraints of the Constitution, but in the end, just as Gotô had intended, the government took the option of cutting Taiwan off from "the legal system characteristic of Japan proper." The Government-General was granted by the emperor the power to issue edicts that had force equivalent to law, and its only political responsibility was to the emperor as sovereign. The road to obtaining rights to participate in politics was closed almost entirely to Taiwanese. Of primary importance here is not how this colonial regime compares to others, but the political implications of the very task of comparison itself. It was through comparison that Takekoshi sought to legitimize Japan's rule over Taiwan in the eyes of Europeans and Americans and to appeal to the "sympathies of the civilized world." Toward the Japanese people, on the other hand, Takekoshi sought through comparison to demonstrate that denial of the Taiwanese right to participate politically was consistent with practice in all colonial administrations; he also aimed to whitewash the violence committed under this autocratic system of rule.

Having clarified the dependent status of the Taiwanese politically, Gotô turned to the economic task of completing the basic projects necessary to allow capitalism to penetrate, such as surveying the land, constructing railroads, digging harbors, etc. These were absolutely necessary in order to convince people at home and abroad that the leaders of Japan were agents of *la mission civilisatrice*. Indeed, the missionaries showed unconcealed pleasure at completion of the rail line traversing Taiwan on the West, and Li also extolled Gotô's virtues in "A Biographical Sketch of Baron Gotô Shinpei," where he also wrote, regarding the railroads and harbor facilities, that "the Taiwan of ten years ago hardly differed from a village of barbarians, while today it has been transformed into a world where civilization prospers."[53]

Capital for the various projects to advance civilization came largely from monopoly sales of opium, camphor, salt, tobacco, and other products. The sale of opium was suggested and initiated by Gotô when he was head of the Hygiene Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs, before he was appointed chief of the Civil Affairs Bureau. Gotô opposed a complete ban on opium, as that would drive habitual users to their deaths; he hoped that by selling officially produced opium only to those with licenses to buy it, he could eventually eliminate the

evil habit of opium smoking and at the same time increase the Government-General's revenue. Indeed, it appears to have been an ingenious policy, but of course there was no guarantee that the Government-General would not issue excessive numbers of licenses in order to further increase revenue. In fact, during the Russo-Japanese War, the missionary Dr. P. Anderson who was engaged in medical activities in Takao reported that, "I do hear often enough of their hunting up those who have ceased to smoke (temporarily at least), with a view to their renewing their licenses," and added that, "the local authorities are under great temptation to almost any methods that will bring in revenue."[54]

Opium smoking had been strictly prohibited in Japan proper ever since the opening of the country to the Western powers in 1858. It was 1898 before the government monopoly system was initiated with experimental sales of tobacco. In economic policy as well, Taiwan was able to take exceptional measures for securing revenue because of its colonial status. From Gotô's perspective, these were consistent with "the trends of the world" and were efficient means in carrying out the "civilizing mission."

In the field of education as well, differences from Japan proper were quite evident. The educational system Gotô set up while he was Director of Civil Administration placed Japanese and Taiwanese schools in different tracks; the Japanese went to "elementary schools" that conformed to the system in Japan proper, while Taiwanese went to "public schools" with a special curriculum. Coeducation of the Japanese and Taiwanese ethnic groups was forbidden. There were no middle schools to provide liberal education, so the Government-General's Japanese Language Schools (*Kokugo gakkô*) and Medical School provided the extent of post-elementary education available to Taiwanese. The consistent orientation underlying these facilities was that there should be no disruption of the status order between peoples and thus Japanese superiority over Taiwanese should be guaranteed. In the state of social fluidity that followed dissolution of the prescribed status order of the Tokugawa era in Japan proper, the education system served as the means of selecting a national elite, but people in the *colony* were excluded from that process.

Gotô Shinpei's tendency to restrict the spread of education naturally conflicted with Li Chun-shen's conception. Chen Pei-feng has characterized Li and Gotô as "lying in the same bed but dreaming different dreams," showing that they were at odds, especially in regard to education.[55] As the basis for his argument, Chen

refers to the fact that Li made handsome contributions to promote the spread of education in the 1910s, but contributed nothing during the era when Gotô was Director of Civil Administration. He also points out that Gotô wrote critically regarding Li in "Monthly Comments on Gentry in Taipei" saying, "He is bigoted in his opinions and miserly by nature. Ever since Taiwan became part of the empire, he has calculated his own interest but coldly spurned the public good."[56] For his part, Li might have meant his refusal to make further donations as a tacit protest against Gotô's restrictive approach to education. Despite his praise for Gotô in "A Biographical Sketch of Baron Gotô Shinpei," their relationship seems to have been cool; as Chen points out, Li's initial hope for "salvation by faith" (*tariki hongan*) — that is, his naive trust that his support for Japan would be rewarded with modernization as he interpreted it — was snuffed out early on. He also gradually realized his mistake in wishfully seeing Japan as a state that protected Christianity.

Emperor Worship as Racism

In his contribution to *Fifty Years of New Japan*, Gotô writes in a self-satisfied vein regarding the restoration of public order following suppression of the anti-Japanese guerrillas and the preparation of infrastructure resulting in industrial development as signifying the "success" of Japanese rule in Taiwan. On education, however, he resorts to the awkward comment that, "As regards education in Formosa, it is as yet a matter of study and consideration what measures may be the best to adopt."[57] He seems to recognize religion's importance, by saying, "How far religion affects colonization it is needless to conjecture here," but then writes frankly, "The question therefore arises whether Japan had any such religion to rely upon. To this the answer, I am sorry to say, must be in the negative."[58] No doubt he was keenly aware that, in as much as Christianity has been viewed as an important element in the construction of civilized values, Japan could not in this regard be viewed as a "civilized country."

How, then, did Western missionaries evaluate Japan's administration of Taiwan? In 1896, Thomas Barclay, a missionary sent by the Presbyterian Church of England, wrote in a report to the London headquarters that, "One cannot but sympathise with the people, dissociated without their consent being asked from the ancient Empire of China, with all its traditions, of which they are so proud, and handed

over to form a despised Empire.... In the meantime, there seem to be some advantages to be hoped for. The change will improve the conditions of life for missionaries, and the greater facilities of communication will greatly help our work. The destruction of the Mandarinate and perhaps still more of the literary class as a body, involving the discrediting of Confucianism, will remove many obstacles out of our way."[59]

In the eyes of this missionary of Scottish origin, Japan was nothing more than a "despised Empire." On the other hand, his posture of naive faith in modernization and its development of the means of communication, along with his assignment of top priority to the dissemination of Christianity, caused him, like Li, to prefer Japanese rule to that of the Qing empire. That is precisely why Gotô Shinpei sought to win the missionary's favor by such measures as supporting their school for the blind. Nevertheless, that alone was insufficient as a means to wipe away the image of Japan as a "despised Empire" and demonstrate the "high morality" of the Japanese rulers. To the extent that political discrimination and economic exploitation — as symbolized in the pattern of "opium in the left hand, bible in the right" — dominated the realities of colonial rule, it was necessary to fabricate some kind of morality to obscure those realities. With his keen insight into Western imperialism, Gotô must have been painfully aware of that necessity. Yet, although he demonstrated clear vision in other areas, on these points he could only respond ambiguously. Why was that so?

When Gotô writes modestly that in Japan there was no religion that could be relied upon, hidden behind his words was his evaluation of modern Japan's favored pseudo-religion, emperor worship. In principle, that is, he could have adopted the alternative of propagating in Taiwan, and establishing at the nucleus of religious and educational policy, the same pseudo-religion of emperor worship that obtained in Japan proper. That he did not suggests that, unlike the Government-General bureaucrats of later years, Gotô was skeptical regarding the probable effect of such a policy.

As noted above, emperor worship was devised as an equivalent to Christianity in order to aid in national unification. An important role in instilling such worship was played by school rituals carried out on the imperial holidays that were institutionalized in the early 1890s. Consisting of such elements as obeisance to the imperial couple's portrait, reading of the Imperial Rescript on Education, moral admonitions by the principal, and the singing of "Kimigayo," these ceremonies

produced an atmosphere appropriate to a place of worship. Then, in 1898, the Ministry of Education banned religious education from all formal schools and sought the basis for moral education not in the bible or Buddhist sutras but the Imperial Rescript on Education. Moreover, although not provided for by law, shrine worship organized through the schools began to be encouraged.[60]

Shrine worship originates in Shintô, an amalgam of various religious customs based on animistic conceptions of the sacred. However, Shintô changed markedly in the course of the Meiji government's efforts to consolidate and standardize it as emperor worship. The newly formed state Shintô situated the emperor at the top as high priest, and although there was no unified doctrine, government-employed priests were made to carry out rites prescribed by the government. According to the government's official view, shrine worship was not religious activity and therefore did not contradict the "freedom of belief" provided for in the Imperial Constitution. Aside from what people believed, shrine worship was considered desirable as patriotic behavior. At the same time, the methods and extent of coercion varied with time and place, although in most cases it was encouraged through tangible or intangible measures via the school system.

In the process of forming state Shintô, many folk practices associated with Shintô were suppressed, and sometimes actively persecuted as evil rites or heresy. Of course, no matter how wrenching were the changes they were subjected to, in Japan proper the original shrines still continued to exist in most areas, whereas in Taiwan there were no shrines to begin with and unique local beliefs associated with Taoism were the most prevalent. For that reason alone, it would have been difficult to transport Japan's system of emperor worship wholesale to Taiwan. In addition, there were the following obstacles.

In the first place, there was concern that importation of emperor worship would be criticized by Christians as an infringement upon "freedom of belief." Of course, such criticism occurred in Japan proper as well, but it was especially dangerous in the colony, where it was always difficult to recruit collaborators. We need to remember that, for missionaries like Barclay as well as Taiwanese Christians like Li, the perception that, unlike the Qing, Japan was tolerant of "freedom of belief" was a major element in their support for Japanese rule. Also, as Wu Wening's research has shown, even though Taiwan's Christian population was less than 1% in 1900, one out of every four graduates (1902 to 1906) of the Government-General's medical school was the descendent of a Christian, and

Christians were among the few who welcomed the Government-General's new educational policy.[61] Introduction of emperor worship would only antagonize this important minority.

Second, there were issues related to factors intrinsic to emperor worship, such as its relative lack of the kind of systematic doctrine that was typical of Christianity and Buddhism, and also the fact that it was a new religion that emphasized this-worldly benefits while lacking a transcendental, otherworldly perspective. The problem here was that unless there was some basis for the claim of tangible benefit, it would not attract adherents. In Japan proper, victory in the Sino-Japanese War had contributed to an image of the emperor as a beneficent entity who provided the "spoils" of war, but clearly it would be difficult to sell the same concept to people who were themselves part of those "spoils."

Third, as another problem intrinsic to emperor worship, one can point to its fundamental reliance on a rhetoric of consanguinity. For example, as in the formulation by the legal scholar Hozumi Yatsuka, if the "Japanese race" (*Nihon minzoku*) traces its origins back far enough they will find that all are ultimately descended from the imperial household. Thus, "sovereign and people have common ancestors" and form a "group based on blood" (*kettô dantai*). Thus, at the foundation of emperor worship were myths impervious to all rational argumentation. According to these myths, the question of whether or not an individual belonged to the "Japanese race" was to be determined on the basis of the "natural" attribute of blood line, and this attribute was institutionalized in the form of the ubiquitous family register.

When Gotô Shinpei rejected any direct application of the Japanese Constitution to Taiwanese, he wrote that it was impossible to "bring new people under the blessings of the Constitution on a basis equal to those who for three thousand years have loyally served the imperial household."[62] The logic by which he legitimates his exclusion of Taiwanese from the Constitution's "blessings" relies on the "fact" of mutual connections centering on the imperial household for the past "three thousand years." Here, exclusive links to the imperial household constitute the "family circle" (*uchiwa*) of the rulers and function as a system to legitimize discrimination against others; therefore, it was best to refrain from publicizing it to the colonized peoples.

What, then, was the standard for determining who were to be included among those who "for three thousand years have loyally served the imperial household"?

In day to day life, one's name played an important role, but when it came to determining legal rights and duties it was the family registration system that was relied upon. The family register was the basis for determining matters of conscription, taxation, education, hygiene, etc., and the criterion for arbitrating within the fixed realm of kinship any changes in an individual's status on account of birth, marriage, or death. In the same year that Gotô went to Taiwan, a new family registration law was promulgated along with the civil code in Japan proper, but rather than extend this law to Taiwan, the authorities established a different system there.

The primary means of moving from one family registration system to another were marriage and adoption, but a number of obstacles blocked these processes. In the case of marriage, domestic partnerships in which one partner was governed by the registration system of Japan proper and the other by the system in Taiwan were until the 1930s considered merely common-law relationships. Transfer of registration from one system to the other by means other than marriage or adoption was prohibited until the collapse of the empire. In effect, the categories of "Japanese" and "Taiwanese" were differentiated on the basis of consanguinity and reproduced in a manner that precisely corresponded to the rhetoric of emperor worship.

Emperor worship with the above characteristics should be considered as an equivalent to racism or, indeed, as racism itself. If we define racism as discrimination based on skin color, then Japanese as part of the "yellow race" will be classified solely as the objects rather than the subjects of racism. In fact, even at the present time it is common for Japanese to see themselves merely as the victims of "racial discrimination," which they interpret in light of the distinction in Japanese language between the term "race" (*jinshu*), based on biological differences, and the cultural category of "ethnic group" (*minzoku*). However, according to Robert Miles's definition, racism selects as an important standard some arbitrarily chosen characteristic such as skin color, and on the basis of that characteristic categorizes human groups and applies to them negative (or positive) stereotypes. Usually the arbitrarily chosen characteristic "is a phenotypical feature (e.g., skin colour, hair type, shape of the head), but genetic and other less immediately visible biological phenomena (e.g., blood) are also signified."[63]

Michael Weiner, who has studied the history of Koreans in Japan, invokes Miles's definition, but treats the racial/cultural discrimination perpetrated by

Japanese as a variant of racism. As he points out, the important issue in defining racism is not whether it is to be based on biological or cultural characteristics, but how those characteristics are employed. What is important is that, "the possession of these supposed characteristics may be used to justify the denial of the group's equal access to material and other resources and/or political rights."[64] Based on this point, the process by which a cultural tendency to despise Taiwanese as "Chankoro" spread in conjunction with the institutionalization of colonial rule should be considered tantamount to the process by which emperor worship begins to function as a variant of racism. The Taiwan Government-General sought to foster an image in which all were equal as recipients of the imperial benevolence and in order to give substance to this rhetoric, repeatedly claimed that eventually Taiwanese would be thoroughly assimilated. But it was thought necessary to make such claims precisely because in its essence, emperor worship is a mechanism for racial and ethnic exclusionism.

The source of headaches for the Japanese colonial administrators was that this emperor worship might indeed, on the one hand, substitute for Christianity as an "axis" of national unification but simultaneously, on the other, would act in the dimension of colonial rule as an equivalent to racism. Agents of Western imperialism found it possible to obscure the cruelty of their strict discrimination between "white" and "non-white" by relying on the pseudo-universalism of Christianity. However, such a strategy was difficult in the Japanese case, at least to the extent that emperor worship was formed as a defensive reaction to "universalistic" Christianity. Their inability to make the same distinctions as the Western imperialists made it difficult for the Japanese rulers to demonstrate their "high morality."

Skepticism regarding the effects of introducing emperor worship directly into Taiwanese schools did erupt during Gotô's tenure as Director of Civil Administration. One Japanese teacher in a public school pointed out that the content of the ethics curriculum was discouraging and unbearably "confused and inconsistent," adding that "to harp on sentiments of kinship" — such as, that "sovereign and people have common ancestors" and form a "group based on blood" — "could lead to dangerous results;" therefore, he suggested, it might be best not to teach the Rescript on Education for a while.[65] Gotô proved unable to come up with a positive solution to this problem. The regulations for public schools set forth in 1904 stipulated that the Rescript should be the basis for ethics

instruction, but the textbook that was to give specificity to the Rescript's principles was never compiled during Gotô's term in office, nor were regulations established to regulate school ceremonies on holidays.

While ambiguously shelving issues related to the ideals of education, Gotô did set out a policy of thoroughly pursuing Japanese language education from the elementary level onward. This was because by elevating Japanese language to the level of a formal ruling culture, it was possible to portray the Japanese as "competent" and the Taiwanese as "incompetent." Among Taiwanese, demands for modern education gradually manifested themselves, and the supression of Taiwanese language and Chinese writing were criticized, along with the inadequacy of institutions for secondary education. Moreover, the hidden confrontation between emperor worship and Christianity inevitably came to the fore.

The Anti-Japanese Movement and Tainan Presbyterian Middle School

Considerable pressure for change was put on the education policy of the Taiwan Government-General in the 1910s and 1920s. In 1911, Kumamoto Shigekichi, chief of the School Affairs Section, wrote regarding that policy that, "On the surface we act as though we place great importance on education, but in fact we take no action to encourage it." Schools had been established only to the extent deemed necessary under the watchful "eyes and ears of the Western powers."[66] No new facilities for secondary education were set up, and those that existed were just low-level vocational schools. Thus, the colonial officials had deemed it important just to establish sufficient facilities to avoid Western criticism, and their conscious decision not to develop secondary education suggests that at this stage they were still following the line established by Gotô.

However, dissatisfaction with the Government-General was spreading among powerful Taiwanese. In 1912, forseeing that an application to establish a private middle school of the new type would be denied, they went to the missionaries with funds to expand the existing Tainan Presbyterian Middle School so as to offer a full liberal education. This school had been established by missionaries prior to the Japanese takeover of Taiwan and retained many aspects of its original mission as a preparatory school for those going on to seminary. Sponsors of the proposal numbered twenty-eight in all, among whom only Li Chun-shen was a

Christian, but the application said, "We offer the money, but have no intention of meddling in Christian educational policy." This was clearly an attractive proposal from the viewpoint of the missionaries, and in his letter to the London headquarters Barclay quoted the Taiwanese benefactors as saying, "If you can get $20,000 for rebuilding a broken-down temple, surely we can get it for a school; the idols are all very well, but not so important as a good education."[67]

The endorsers of the proposal included some, like Li, who had adapted early to his sense of world trends by converting to Christianity, but in the eyes of most of these influential men the missionaries, who despised as mere "idols" the deities worshipped in temple halls, were disturbers of social peace. Nevertheless, at a time when on the Chinese mainland the traditional examination system had been abolished, and then in 1912 momentous historical changes accompanied the establishment of the Republic of China, even conventional local gentry had no choice but to conclude that " idols are all very well, but not so important as a good education."

In the end, the Taiwan Government-General, which disliked any extension of Christian power, decided to establish a public middle school. The Government-General had no choice but to concede, since it needed the support of influential Taiwanese in the war to subjugate the aboriginal population. Of course, at the level of the Government-General, this decision faced powerful opposition when official permission was sought from Tokyo. The home government opposed the idea because "efforts to raise the level of general education needlessly contribute to developing the civilized consciousness of indigenous society and might bring results injurious to colonial rule." Additional arguments were that schools should be low level because of local concerns about the length of the school year and entrance qualifications.[68] Here, one can easily detect refrains of the colonialist logic underlying the statement in *Tokyo asahi shinbun*, quoted above, to the effect that "often when unenlightened people are rapidly imbued with civilized education the results are contrary to intent."

In response to the home government's tendency to adhere closely to the logic of colonial rule, Kumamoto argued that, "In our view the safest way to maintain control is to provide appropriate education," but in the end the Government-General had to comply with the home government's demands.[69] It is worth noting that the Government-General had turned away from the view that the spread of education should be restricted in favor of the theory that under

rigid control it was best to disseminate education as a "safety valve." According to this view, the demands for modern education on the part of influential Taiwanese should not simply be suppressed but should rather be encouraged and guided. It was as if they would be told, we'll provide you with a chance for modern education, but in return you must accept Japanese as the "national language" along with emperor worship. Indeed, during Kumamoto's term as School Affairs Section head, an ethics text was finally compiled and holiday ceremonies were introduced in the public schools. Even though the Taiwanese were not going to become whole-hearted "believers" in the cult of emperor worship, the condition of a modern education was to be their acceptance of a value system that situated the Japanese as a superior people.

In the 1920s, when it was necessary somehow to respond to the world trend toward "national self-determination," the home government itself took the initiative in carrying out reforms in the above direction. That is, in 1922 the Government-General issued the Taiwan Education Ordinance, which stipulated that although in principle Japanese and Taiwanese would continue to be educated separately at the elementary level, they would now go to the same secondary and higher schools. At the same time, the entrance examinations and curriculum in secondary schools would still be almost entirely in Japanese, and in order to pass the entrance exams it would be necessary to memorize the Imperial Rescript on Education. Moreover, the provisions of the Taiwan Public Secondary School Regulations, passed in conformity with the Taiwan Education Ordinance, stated explicitly that on the regular festival days, students should visit Taiwan Shrine for worship. Thus, while these regulations aimed at a certain level of equality, they also clarified relations of subordination in the cultural realm and constituted a "new concept" in colonial rule.[70]

Enactment of the Taiwan Education Ordinance placed the Tainan Presbyterian Middle School in a difficult position. Because it was not an official middle school, its graduates were not qualified to go on to higher schools; therefore most of those students who did aspire to continue their education dropped out and transferred to middle schools in Japan proper. On the other hand, the Government-General was afraid that recognizing the Presbyterian School as a formal middle school would open a breach in the rampart of educational control. Contrary to the case in other public middle schools, this school was aimed solely at Taiwanese and promoted bible study in their own language, so it had the potential of gaining

the overwhelming support of the Taiwanese. Consequently, the Government-General resorted to financial hurdles as a pretext for nonrecognition, and demanded a very large donation for purposes of establishing an endowment fund.

In order to qualify their school to send students on to higher education, in 1925 people connected to the Presbyterian Middle School organized a supporters' organization to carry out a five-year campaign with the objective of raising ¥100,000. Playing a central role in the organization was Lim Bo-seng (Lin Mao-shen in Mandarin). The missionary, Edward Band, who was principal of the Presbyterian school from 1912, wrote that, "Mr. Lim Bo-seng, our head teacher, is occupied in touring the country, giving lectures, writing scrolls, and seeking to enlist subscribers.... So eloquent are Mr. Lim's powers of persuasion that within a few months he has received £2,000 in promises."[71]

Lim Bo-seng was born in Tainan in 1887. After graduating from the Presbyterian Middle School, in 1907 he continued his education in Japan proper, eventually graduating from the College of Literature, Tokyo Imperial University. Thus, he was Taiwan's first Bachelor of Arts under Japanese rule.[72] He became head teacher at his alma mater, and in 1921 participated as a lecturer in the newly established Taiwan Cultural Association (Taiwan Bunka Kyôkai) which functioned as part of the anti-Japanese movement. When the Association's publication, *Taiwan minpao*, took up the question of the Presbyterian Middle School, it reported that "On the basis of their different beliefs, up to now many people have refused to contribute to Christian schools, but as the result of Lim Bo-seng's reputation now a substantial number of people from all walks of life are offering support." The paper speculated the rather than "wasting" money on old-fashioned idolatry these people were choosing to invest in "raising the level of Taiwanese culture."[73] In the early 1910s, the influential Taiwanese donors had stipulated that "idols are all very well" and at that time foreign religion had come to be viewed negatively. So, clearly, there was change over time. Lim Bo-seng was similar to Li Chun-shen in his Christian belief and enthusiasm for the dissemination of modern education, but he differed in being active at a time when he could attract many supporters among Taiwanese. On the other hand, the Taiwan Government-General, which from the outset of Japanese rule had presented itself as a proponent of modernization, was now clearly in the position of intervening in that process.

Lim Bo-seng's plea for aid in expanding the Presbyterian Middle School and

making it into a normally accredited institution was appealing to many Taiwanese, whether Christian or not. This seems to suggest clearly that feelings of frustration with the colonial education system had spread widely. While it is true that the Taiwan Education Ordinance had opened up opportunities for Taiwanese to receive a secondary and higher level education, it was still extremely difficult to qualify for such schools. Because from the beginning there had not been a system of compulsory education, the rate of advancement to public school was very low. Fewer than 1% were able to enter secondary schools.

Lim's efforts bore fruit, and although the Presbyterian Middle School had not yet succeeded in raising the entire amount that had been stipulated, in May 1927 the Government-General recognized its establishment of an endowment fund. The founders were Edward Band and Lim Bo-seng. They also formed a Board of Managers, with five representatives each from the Mission Council, the South Formosan (Taiwanese) Church Presbytery, and the supporters of the School Endowment Fund.[74] However, the same month, Lim left for Columbia University as a foreign researcher under the auspices of the Government-General. This all too timely appointment might have resulted from a destructive strategy on the part of the Government-General, but Lim tried to turn it to his own uses. At Columbia he selected "Public Education in Formosa under Japanese Administration" as a thesis topic, and clearly outlined the various problems involved in the exclusive use of Japanese language and the system of jointly educating the two ethnic groups. In his conclusion, he states, "Modern education aims to develop the individual from within, not impose a development from without for fear that it would spoil the creative power on the part of the child. Assimilation sets out to impose standards for its own from without which are not desired."[75] This selection aptly suggests what kind of *modernity* Lim sought. It should be noted that even the seemingly naive assertion that education should "develop the individual from within" calls sharply into question whether or not the Government-General's colonial education policy could indeed be called *modern*.

On the above point Band, the school principal, had the same views as Lim. In a report he wrote in 1930, he remarked critically that, "A state in which all Formosans think, speak, and act according to the same standardised Japanese pattern, may be very pleasing to imperialistic politicians, but hardly satisfactory to the more thoughtful Japanese educationalists." He then remarked more

reflectively that, "Even we Christian educationalists, in spite of our alleged emphasis on the things of the spirit, in our desire for quick results and in a slavish conformity to government methods, may be tempted to educate by 'reforming from without' rather than 'transforming from within'."[76] It is easy to detect behind his use of the phrase, "slavish conformity to government methods" a critical consciousness with respect to the Government-General's educational policy.

Of course, Band's approach was also contradictory. At the December 1928 meeting of the supporters' association the opinion was expressed that a Taiwanese should be elected principal, and Band understood this desire, in the sense that "This Middle School should be rendered independent by Taiwanese themselves in accord with the demands of the time, and it is therefore natural that the job of principal should also be held by a person from the island." But he did not come out and say this clearly at the time.[77] In propagating Christianity the missionaries in Taiwan upheld the principles of "self-government, self-support, self-propagation" in line with the parliamentary spirit of the Presbyterian Church, and they had actively pursued the principle of self-support in the sense that the school had become less dependent on financial aid from London. Yet, they had shown less concern to actualize "self-government." In opposition to this tendency on the part of the missionaries, the Taiwanese in the supporters' organization adopted a "Declaration" that plainly set out the need for change in the nature of the school, saying that, "Although support comes from the British and its creed is Christianity, in essence this is a purely Taiwanese educational institution. We hope and pray that it can be a Taiwanese school in every way."[78]

Dissension in relations with the missionaries had arisen because non-Christian Taiwanese had risen to important positions in the supporters' organization. However, more seriously, disagreements had also appeared in their relations with the Taiwanese Christians. The younger Taiwanese tended to exceed the intentions of the missionaries in criticizing the status quo of church affairs.

This tension was clearly revealed in the circumstances that arose in conjunction with the Young People's Conference held during summer vacations at the Presbyterian Middle School beginning in 1929. For example, in reflecting on the third such Conference, held in 1931, the young and only recently appointed missionary, F. Healey, wrote, "Electrons and instincts and social reform; Einstein and Kagawa and Marx; Beauty, Truth and Goodness; these were some of the catchwords which they wanted to relate to the gospel.... A Formosan who is

trying to secure adequate political rights for his countrymen" spoke with prophetic fire mixed with irony, humor and enthusiasm, and "even when his attacks on the sluggish church somewhat offended older pastors," his words firmly gripped the hearts of the young people.[79] L. Singleton, a missionary who taught chemistry at the school, reported as follows:

> [T]here are the very rich and the very poor. This and the Japanese-Chinese race feeling give rise to a form of Communism different a little from that *in* China or Japan proper. Christ and Marx are held to preach one gospel. Inequality of material wealth and the power rising therefrom are the real evil. The rich are to be disposed by violence, that all may be equal. How men may get rid of the lusts of their hearts, that all may walk equally as brothers in Christ, such thoughts do not arise, or are considered as opiate dope.[80]

Around 1930, not only in Europe and North America but in Japan, as well, theology such as that of Karl Barth, which was skeptical of the existing state of the church, was gaining influence and it was a time of activism on the part of a Christian student movement that yearned for social change. Among the young Taiwanese were some who had brought such ideas back from their studies in Japan proper.[81] However, Singleton's report suggests that the understanding of Christianity embraced by the young people of Taiwan was not merely an imported theory but a conviction rooted in and nourished by the realities of colonization. Moreover, as indicated in Singleton's final sentence, the missionaries were on the whole quite cool toward this tendency. For them, an orientation to social change through violence deviated from the orthodox faith, which aimed at "conformity with love."

If we think about this in conjunction with Takeuchi Yoshimi's dictum on "reconstructing civilization by resisting it," we can understand the Taiwanese youths as attempting to "reconstruct the church by resisting it." Amidst the realities of colonization there was germinating in Taiwan a brand of Christianity completely at odds with what had originally been brought "with opium in the left hand and bible in the right." The missionaries were being left behind by that movement. And for the Japanese bureaucrats, a tangible threat appeared when Lim Bo-seng and the others associated with the Presbyterian Middle School cleared the financial hurdles and in conjunction with the anti-Japanese movement became, in substance, a "Taiwanese educational institution." The unstable relationship among

the Government-General, British missionaries and influential Taiwanese was now clearly sundered, and a force field of sharp tension was forming.

It was in the midst of this situation that the Government-General made shrine worship into a prerequisite for obtaining recognition as a private middle school. In this manner, the card of emperor worship that had been embossed at the outset of Japanese rule over Taiwan was now being played in support of repression.

Shrine Worship as Violence

In 1929, Band mentioned the shrine worship issue in a yearbook read by missionaries in Japan proper, Taiwan, and Korea:

> My own impression is that if we could see our way to confirm the shrine worship, recognition would soon be granted, but of course we have no intention of doing so.... Merely to satisfy a few over zealous Shintoist officials, it would be mistaken in colonial policy to impose unduly a Shintoist Cult upon the Formosan people. To demand the attendance of pupils at the shrines as a necessary condition would be more than a mistake. It would be religious tyranny, subtle and refined, but none the less cruel.[82]

While criticizing shrine worship in this manner, Band also held that, "So long as Christian principles are not infringed, the Christian schools in Taiwan should sincerely cooperate with the Government-General in cultivating loyalty among the people of Taiwan." He was only concerned about the means of expressing such loyalty, which was clearly prejudicial to "freedom of belief."

Minutes of the Mission Council meeting of January 1931 recorded that, "The Council unanimously agreed that as long as elements of religious significance were still retained in connection with the shrines it could not recommend the Board of Managers to apply for recognition."[83] Nevertheless, following the "Manchurian Incident" and the process leading to Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, nationalism rose as the counterpart to uneasiness rooted in Japan's international isolation, and pressure for enforcement of shrine worship rose precipitately. Held up as the scapegoat to this nationalism was none other than Christianity, which was inseparable from the "the West." In Japan proper, in 1932 the military attacked the Catholic-denominated Sophia University on the pretext that its students were failing to engage in shrine worship. The university authorities subsequently accepted shrine worship as an expression of

patriotism and loyalty, as it was put by the Minister of Education, and took the grave step of conforming to both educational policy and shrine worship.

In May 1933, having considered the viewpoint of the Ministry of Education, the Board of Managers of Presbyterian Middle School asked the Mission Council to review the matter of whether or not to allow shrine visits. The non-Christian Taiwanese — whose sense of crisis was mounting as, amidst cries of "emergency," the school's chances of accreditation seemed to be slipping further away — had concluded that the school had to accept shrine worship. In September, after intense struggle, the Mission Council recommended to the Board of Managers that shrine worship be accepted. Singleton, who had argued against the measure, wrote the London headquarters separately, saying that, "for members of the native Synod to express their opinion frankly on Shrine attendance would mean running some risk at present." He argued that despite the argument that it merely signified an expression of patriotism, shrine ceremonies clearly contained religious meaning, and that when it came to forcing shrine worship on Taiwanese Christians, "we cannot remain neutral, or unwillingly acquiescent. It should be remembered that 90% of the Formosan population has not the historical background even of the masses in Japan proper."[84]

No final decision emerged from the Board that received the Mission Council's recommendation. The reason was that the Taiwanese church representatives could not agree. The chairman of the Board at this time was Lim Bo-seng, who had returned from the United States. No final decision was made to institute shrine visits, but those opposed to the measure were eventually reduced to a minority, and dissension was beginning to occur even among those associated with the school.

In January 1934, while Band was in Britain on vacation, a rather trifling matter provided the occasion on which the shrine worship issue became a social problem. The immediate issue was the Board's firing, after a series of incidents, of the Japanese teacher, Uemura Kazuhito. Singleton, who was acting principle, said regarding the reason for the firing that, "Due to promises unfilled etc., he had already lost the confidence of our Old Boys, their parents, contributors to the Endowment Fund." He then added that, "we learnt afterwards that there had been words better left unsaid between this teacher and the Chairman of the Board, Mr. Rin Mosei [Lim Bo-seng in Japanese]."[85] It is expressed ambiguously here, but one can imagine that Uemura might have hurled a term like "Chankoro" at Lim, and that he had exploded in response.

According to Band's account of the incident, when Uemura heard he had been fired he, "linked it up with the burning question of Shrine attendance, and cast aspersions on Dr. Lim's loyalty as a Japanese subject, thereby enlisting sympathy from the Japanese, among whom nationalism has now attained feverish height."[86] Toward the end of February, the remaining seven Japanese resigned en masse and simultaneously sent a petition to the Education Office of Tainan district, demanding that "the Board be reconstituted with five new Japanese members," that "a Japanese be nominated as principal," etc.[87] With this, the problem escalated beyond the question of whether or not to accept shrine worship, and now involved fundamental issues of school governance and general educational policy. The same day, the Tainan Dôshikai (Tainan Comrades Association), an organization of influential Japanese residents of Tainan, met and devoted its energies to an attack on Presbyterian Middle School; the Japanese language newspaper also began a campaign against the school.

Meanwhile, at Presbyterian Middle School, on March 3 Lim Bo-seng issued a statement saying that, "ceremonies of the state should be participated in," thereby adopting a policy of recognizing shrine worship as nonreligious behavior, adding that "in order to unify residents of Japan proper with those of Taiwan, all spiritual discrimination should be completely eliminated."[88] Discreetly hiding the fact that it was precisely "spiritual discrimination" on the part of the Japanese that touched off the incident, Lim attempted to dispose of it by agreeing to carry out shrine visits. However, in fact, the incident had only begun. On March 4, the Tainan Dôshikai held an extraordinary meeting and decided to urge the Government-General to exercise its jurisdiction and abolish the Presbyterian Middle School, which "cannot be recognized for even one day as an educational institution of the Japanese empire."[89]

In the meantime, the Japanese teachers who had resigned en masse charged in the press that "when they had spoken about the superiority of, and the need for reverence to, Japan's national essence (*kokutai*), Taiwanese students would invariably whisper to each other in a rebellious manner. And when the teachers would mention the Japanese spirit, the students would murmur about the Taiwanese spirit." The teachers also stated that when they had "aggressively enforced the use of Japanese," acting principal Singleton would make statements to the effect that, "if they imposed Japanese too coercively it would be like the imposition of English on Ireland, and be counter-productive." On the pretext of

such cases, they demanded the resignation of Lim Bo-seng, abolition of the position of Professor of Taiwanese language, and other changes.[90] Then, on March 6, Tainan Provincial Governor Imagawa Fukashi issued the statement that, "those who oppose the guiding spirit of this island [Taiwan] under cover of religion will be strictly censured."[91]

When the Tainan governor formally showed support for the campaign, the racial and ethnic feelings of the Japanese mounted to a fever pitch. In Band's words, this loosed a "terrific storm of hate and the fierce floods of nationalistic feelings."[92] Band cut short his vacation in England and sped back to Taiwan. Based on the judgment that survival of the school was top priority, he accepted a set of school "reforms" that almost entirely met the demands of Governor Imagawa. This meant not only explicitly legislating shrine attendance, but appointing a Japanese principal and Board members, and abolishing the professorship of Taiwanese language. Band's line of defense was to argue that the Japanese principal and Board members should be Christians. Board chairman Lim Bo-seng and Ng Su-beng (Huang Si-ming in Mandarin), who had taken charge of the students' religious instruction as School Chaplain, were forced to resign all school positions they held.

Thus, the Government-General succeeded in violently forcing the Presbyterian Middle School, which had sought to evade control, back under close supervision and subordination. Under historical circumstances in which it was no longer necessary to cultivate the "sympathy of the civilized world," the Japanese authorities no longer attempted to ignore emperor worship because it stimulated Taiwanese opposition, but instead actively promoted it as a means of reminding the colonials of their subordinate status and threatening them in such a way as to dampen their enthusiasm for resistance.

Ng Su-beng, who felt that he had been betrayed by the British missionaries, went in the midst of his disappointment to visit his son, Huang Zhang-hui, who was studying at Tokyo Imperial University, and began a life devoted to reading the Book of Job. As a result of this experience, Ng Chiong-hui wrote of how deeply his father had respected Principal Band and how he had loved being chaplain at the Presbyterian Middle School; he continued,

> It was indeed a very heavy blow to find himself thrust out from the school and for what were basically political reasons too. Partly it was because of his involvement in the Shinto Shrine controversy, and his strong opposition to 'emperor worship', which was at the centre of the dispute. Partly it was because of his inability, or unwillingness, to teach the Scriptures in Japanese.... It was one of the most painful experiences of my life to hear and see the one whom I loved and respected in such suffering, mental, physical and above all spiritual.[93]

In 1935, the following year, Ng Chiong-hui returned to Taiwan for a rest, and met with Lim Bo-seng. Lim had been extremely angry at the treatment meted out to Ng Su-beng.[94] On the other hand, Edward Band wrote in a report to London that,

> Fortunately there was little anti-foreign feeling against the missionaries, the main attack was directed against the Formosan members of the Board who — it was alleged — had actually interfered with a Japanese head teacher in his laudable efforts to promote national education among the Formosan pupils.... Many Formosans are disappointed that in this affair we missionaries have not stood out as the champion of Formosan independence against the authorities. We have no desire or right to do that. As missionaries, if we can secure an official guarantee that no infringement will be made against perfect freedom for Christian education we must be prepared to carry out the colonial policy of the Japanese authorities.[95]

Here we have a clear statement of the reason Band compromised. In the same manner as the Japanese in the colonies gave absolute authority to the framework of "Japanese/non-Japanese," for Band the distinction "Christian/non-Christian" had exclusive supremacy. The Free Church of Scotland, which was the direct ancestor of the Presbyterian Church of England, was originally formed in protest against domination by the secular state, but what that gave rise to was the attitude that so long as the state did not interfere with freedom of belief, the church would loyally obey the state's commands. Such a principle could even lead the church into union with imperialism.

As Band correctly sensed, his compromises had caused many Taiwanese associates to be disappointed in him. Dai Ming-fu, one of the teachers at the time in the Presbyterian Middle School, wrote that, "I am in complete despair about the direction of the school."[96] Band himself later reflected that, "in the light of subsequent events, those who have watched the religious situation in Japan may now be regretting that the Christian and Buddhist Churches did not make a definite

line somewhere, and at some time earlier make a definite uncompromising stand against this system of State Shinto Shrines."[97]

The Tainan governor, Imagawa, became governor of Taipei district in 1936, and by the same methods attacked and overcame the Tamsui Middle School, which was run by the Canadian Presbyterian Church. In 1937 he was promoted to the prestigious post of chief of the Monopoly Bureau. Considering that the one who profited most from the whole series of events was Imagawa, one might be tempted to believe that he planned it from the beginning. But even if this supposition is correct, it is instructive to remember that his plan could not have succeeded without support from the anxiety-ridden Japanese colonists.

Successive Layers of Violence

Expanding upon Jacques Derrida's *Monolinguality of the Other* (1996), Ukai Satoshi writes,

> The colonist imposes on the colonized a culture that forcibly assimilates them, but is that culture really the colonists' culture? Is it not the case that the colonist himself was originally assimilated, and that in order to forget, or at least avoid recalling, the pain of his own assimilation process, he imposes that culture, as "mine," on the other? Does not colonialist violence originate precisely in the lack of identity between the colonist himself and the culture he imposes, and through diverse linguistic behavior designed to divert attention from that gap — and by constructing through sheer force the conditions that support that behavior — do they not make the other believe in that unity, and by means of the other's belief make themselves believe as well?[98]

Those who wield colonialist violence against others have themselves had violence wielded against them. The very act of wielding violence helps the colonists to forget the pain of their own assimilation, and to believe that what they impart is "their own culture." What Derrida calls "violence" is not necessarily the sort of thing that corresponds to a specific historical event, but he points to an important dimension of colonial rule.

I have attempted to show that, in the midst of pressure for modernization, which advances like huge dominoes falling one after the other, Hugh Matheson and Li Chun-shen manifested the same sort of ambivalence as did Itô Hirobumi.

Matheson's relatives lived through the violence of the Highland Clearances, which heralded the onset of modernity. Li Chun-shen aided in the wielding of violence against the anti-Japanese guerrillas. The kind of double standard that allowed him to flatter those who were thought to be civilized and deal harshly with those he viewed as uncivilized was typical of someone like Itô Hirobumi, Japan's top government leader, but that pattern was not limited to Japanese. That is, there were such "Japanese" among the British and even the Taiwanese as well.

However, that each of the above three individuals was the object as well as the subject of violence does not mean that they were all at the same level. They were rather arranged in a strict hierarchy, and the system of colonial rule was devised precisely in order to rigidify and sustain that hierarchy. In Derrida's case as well, although he takes for granted the historically formed hierarchy of French colonial rule over Algeria, it is important to recognize that his writing incorporates a critique of the identity of "French culture." Derrida's argument is important because he makes clear that this hierarchy has only the most arbitrary basis. He shows it is not the case that such identities as "French culture" and "Japanese culture" exist from the beginning, along with the distinction between "civilized people" and "uncivilized people"; rather, these concepts are formed ex post facto and used in order to translate political domination and social disruption into problems of "culture." He also makes it clear that colonial rule calls forth, stimulates, and employs the desire for modernization, while also preventing its actualization and distorting its direction.

It is always dangerous to step lightly over the circumstances peculiar to each case of imperialism and thus overgeneralize. However, it is also true that, as this essay sought to make clear, Japanese colonial rule was certainly not unique. Rather, in the midst of the seismic shifts caused by modernity, Japan sought to navigate by imitating the Western imperialist models, and developed its colonial rule according to the principle of appealing to the "sympathy of the civilized world." If a major difference existed, it was that by depending upon the pseudo-universalism of Christianity the agents of Western imperialism found it possible to cover up their discriminatory behavior to some extent, while in Japan's case it was difficult for the colonial rulers to develop a "high morality" that suited them. This was inevitable in that the pseudo-religion of emperor worship was ethnically and racially exclusivist in its essence.

In the 1920s and 1930s, the principle of appealing to the "sympathy of the

civilized world" receded into the background and deviation from civilization became increasingly characteristic of Japanese colonial policy. Yet, the civilization that Japan feared and viewed antagonistically was not the modern civilization spawned by Western imperialism but rather the new civilization being produced by colonized peoples as they grappled with the realities of their situation. Although only in the early stages of development, a process that can only be called "reconstructing civilization by resisting it" was emerging among the people of Taiwan, and Japan carried out its deviation from civilization in the process of reacting against this trend. As the vehicle of that reaction, the Japanese imposed the litmus test of shrine worship. Of course, even shrine worship constituted an imposition of "Japanese culture," so there was supposedly no problem. Yet, if we remember that the Japanese had achieved their adaptation to the civilized order precisely by internalizing the gaze of the "white" Westerner, this formulation itself demonstrated just how far they were from any kind of "cultural unity." Moreover, in order to divert their own attention from that inconsistency, it was essential that they force the colonized others to believe.

The Taiwanese people were liberated from imperial Japan in August 1945. On October 25, Chen Yi was dispatched as the governor of Taiwan province in order to incorporate Taiwan into the Chinese Nationalist government, and ceremonies marking Japanese surrender were held. On the anniversary of the reversion to China, Lim Bo-seng, wearing Chinese dress and an expression of excitement and confidence, said to his son, "Finally, the era has arrived in which we can be the masters of our own fate."[99] However, the Nationalist government also denied rights of political participation to Taiwanese on the pretext that they "know nothing of China, nothing of culture, and nothing of the resistance against Japan." Once he realized that the "era in which we can be masters of our own fate" was an illusion, Lim Bo-seng became increasingly depressed and blurted to his son that, "since the end of the war Taiwan is completely isolated and helpless. We have nowhere to turn in our dissatisfaction and anger."[100] Then, in the midst of the February 28th Incident in 1947, he was arrested for inciting the students of Taiwan University, planning rebellion, and "having delusions about Taiwan's independence;" and then he "disappeared."[101] His modest desire to establish an "educational institution for the Taiwanese people" was crushed by the Japanese, he was betrayed by the British missionaries, and killed by the Nationalist government. This was "modernity" for Lim Bo-seng, and the outcome for him of "colonial rule."

The Taiwanese movement that is seeking an apology and compensation from the state for the February 28th Incident, led by Lim Bo-seng's son among others, is putting pressure on the Nationalist Party to recognize its responsibility. Band and Singleton returned to the Presbyterian Middle School after the war and finally turned over major authority to Taiwanese, and even appointed a Taiwanese principal. As for the Japanese government and Japanese people, it must be said that far too much has been forgotten, including the "spiritual" damage done by the litmus test of shrine worship. Perhaps that is because even today in Japanese society the ideals of freedom of thought, belief, and conscience remain formalistic. And finally, the violence that is "subtle and refined, but none the less cruel" is spurred by the spread of racist attitudes and continues to wield destructive force.

ENDNOTES

1 Mitani Taiichirô, *Kindai Nihon no sensô to seiji* [War and politics of modern Japan] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997), 76. Mitani uses the common term "post-colonialism," but because this term does not usually include the perspective of the colonial rulers, I have used "post-imperialism" instead.

2 Maruyama Masao, *Zôhoban Gendai seiji no shisô to kôdô* [Thought and behavior in modern Japanese politics: revised and expanded edition] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1964), 161.

3 Takeuchi Yoshimi, *Nihon to Ajia* [Japan and Asia] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobô, 1993), 18.

4 Takeuchi, 260–263, 283–284.

5 Takeuchi, 285.

6 Frantz Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1965), 313–314.

7 For a critique of past studies of Japanese colonialism, one which is especially critical of facile reliance upon the analytical category of "assimilation policy," see my *Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no bunka tôgô* [Cultural unification under the Japanese colonial empire] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996). The present essay is more or less a synthesis, from a single perspective, of this book and two of my essays: "Bunmei no chitsujo to misshon" [Overseas missions and the civilized order] in *Nenpô: Kindai Nihon kenkyû 19: chiikishi no kanôsei* (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shoten, 1997), and "Tainan chôrôkyô chûgaku jinja sanpai mondai" [The problem of shrine visits at Tainan Presbyterian Middle School], *Shisô* 915 (September 2000). See these works for more detailed coverage of previous research and documentation.

8 For a comparative study of Japanese and European colonial rule, see Lewis Gann, "Western and Japanese Colonialism: Some Preliminary Comparisons," in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

9 Because of this emphasis, I will be forced in this essay to leave out a number of other important topics. In connection with domestic affairs in Taiwan alone, I am unable to discuss such issues as gender and relations between the Han residents of Taiwan and

the aboriginal minorities. I also neglect the Okinawan issue, which is so intimately connected to the administration of Taiwan, and Japan's rule of Korea as well; nor am I able to discuss the role of the United States which displayed an overwhelming presence in East Asia in place of the British. As a cooperative effort in the intellectual arena of *Traces*, I should like to bring these other elements into focus as well.

[10] Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1993), 32–33.

[11] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, revised edition (London: Verso, 1991), 9.

[12] Komatsu Midori, *Itô kô zenshû* 2 (Tokyo: Itô kô zenshû kankôkai, 1927); Seiji enzetsu [political speeches], 49–50. Speech delivered in the ninth session of the House of Peers, January 1896.

[13] Takano Môkyo to Itô Hirobumi, Oct. 1900, in *Itô Hitobumi kankei monjo* 6, ed. Itô Hirobumi Kankei Monjo Kenkyûkai (Tokyo: Hanawa Shobô, 1978), 125.

[14] Komatsu, *Itô kô zenshû* 2, Gakujutsu enzetsu [Academic speeches], 231.

[15] Sakai Naoki, *Shisan sareru Nihongo — Nihonjin* [Still-born Japanese language, Japanese people] (Tokyo: Shinyôsha, 1996), 5.

[16] T. C. Smout, *A Century of Scottish People: 1560–1830* (London: Fontana Press), 322.

[17] G. L. Macay, *From Far Formosa* (Edinburgh and London: Oliphant Anderson & Ferrier, 1896), 14.

[18] Ann Matheson, ed., *Memorial of Hugh M. Matheson* (London: Hodder and Soughton, 1899), 260.

[19] Callum G. Brown, "The Costs of Pew-renting: Church Management, Church-going and Social Class in Nineteenth-century Glasgow," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 38.3 (July 1987): 359.

[20] Donald C. Smith, *Passive Obedience and Prophetic Protest: Social Criticism in the Scottish Church, 1830–1945* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1987), 112.

[21] J. A. Mangan, "Images for confident control,' in *The Imperial Curriculum: Racial Images and Education in the British Colonial Experience*, ed. J. A. Mangan (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 10.

[22] W. S. Swanson, *The China Mission of the Presbyterian Church of England: Its History, Methods, Results* (London: Presbyterian Church of England, 1887), 2.

[23] Ann Matheson, 305–308.

[24] Shunzekô Tsuishôkai, *Itô Hitobumi-den* [Biography of Itô Hirobumi] I (Tokyo: Tôseisha, 1943), 105.

[25] Shunzekô Tsuishôkai, 106.

[26] "The Making of New Japan," *The Westminster Gazette*, March 4, 1895.

[27] Matsuzawa Hiroaki, *Kindai Nihon no keisei to seiyô keiken* [Foreign experience and the formation of modern Japan] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993), 76.

[28] Ann Matheson, 206.

[29] Shimizu Noboru, *Teikoku kenpô seitei kaigi* [The drafting conference for the Japanese constitution] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1940), 88.

[30] Hisaki Yukio, "Meiji-ki tennôsei kyôiku kenkyû hoi" [A supplement to research on education under the Meiji emperor system] *Bukkyô daigaku kyôikugakubu ronshû* 6 (1995).

[31] Leonard H. D. Gordon, "Taiwan and the Powers," in *Taiwan: Studies in Chinese Local History*, ed., Leonard H. D. Gordon (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1970), 109.

[32] Ishii Mayako, *Kindai Chûgoku to Igirisu shihon* [Modern China and English capital] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1998), 290–293. Also see Ishii Kanji, *Kindai Nihon to Igirisu shihon* [Modern Japan and English capital] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1984).

[33] W. Campbell, *Sketches from Formosa* (London, Edinburgh, New York: Marshall Brothers Ltd., 1915), 298–300.

[34] "Anping Dagou senryô subeki keikaku ni tsuki Kabayama sôtoku denpô" [Telegram from Governor-General Kabayama concerning plans to occupy Anping and Dagou], July 2, 1895 (Itô Hirobumi ed., *Hisho ruisan Taiwan shiryô* [*Classified Collections of the Private Documents: Sources Related to Taiwan*] (Tokyo: Hisho Ruisan Kankô Iinkai, 1936), 25.

[35] "Sôri daijin yori Anping Dagou o shikyû senryô subeki mune Kabayama sôtoku e denpô" [Telegram from the Prime Minister to Governor-General Kabayama regarding the urgent need to occupy Anping and Dagou], July 3, 1895, in Itô ed., 26.

[36] "Taiwan sôtokufu jôrei happugo minsei shikô gaikyô hôkoku" [General report on the situation of civil administration after proclamation of the Taiwan Government-General's regulations], September 23, 1895, in Itô ed., 259.

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[39] Li Chun-shen, "Zhu Taiwan xinbao chuangkan" [Celebrating the first issue of the *Taiwan shinpô*], *Taiwan shinpô* 1 (June 17, 1896).

[40] Huang Jun-hie, Ku Wei-ying, "Xinen yu jiuyi zhi jian", in *Li Chun-shen de sixiang yu shidai*, ed. Li Ming-hui (Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1995), 254.

[41] Li Chun-shen, *Donyou liushisi ri suibi*, (Fuzhou: Fuzhou meihua shuju, 1896), 41.

[42] Lai Yong-xiang, *Jioahui shihua*, (Tainan: Renguang chuban, 1995), 117–118.

[43] Harry J. Lamley, "The Younkai of 1900: An Episode in the Transformation of the Taiwan Elite during the Early Japanese Period," in *Rijushiji Taiwan shi guoji xueshu yantaohui lunwenji* (Taipei: University of Taiwan,1993), 116, 126.

[44] Li Chun-shen, "Lun riba youguan shiju", in *Juzhu jinxin* (Fuzhou: Fuzhou meihua shuju, 1894) vol.1, 27.

[45] Li Chun-shen, *Donyou liushisi ri suibi*, 4.

[46] Li Chun-shen, *Donyou liushisi ri suibi*, 51.

[47] *Tokyo asahi shinbun*, May 9, 1896.

[48] For biographical information on Jahana, see Arakawa Akira, *Han kokka no kyôku* (Tokyo: Shakai hyôronsha, 1996). According to Arakawa, rather than the fact that Jahana quit the government and developed the movement for political rights, it is his derangement in the course of that movement and his death in a fit of anger that should be problematized. See Arakawa, 209.

[49] Tsurumi Yûsuke, *Gotô Shinpei*, Second edition (Tokyo: Keisô Shobô, 1965), 35.

[50] Simpei Goto, "The Administration of Formosa (Taiwan)," in *Fifty Years of New Japan* 2, ed. Shigenobu Okuma (London: Smith, Elder & Col, 1909), 530.
[51] Yosaburo Takekoshi, *Japanese Rule in Formosa* (London: Longman, 1907), vii.
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[53] Li Chun-shen, "Gotô Shinpei kô shôden hatsu" [Biographical sketch of Gotô Shinpei], *Taiwan jihô* 8 (February 1910).
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[55] Chen Pei-feng, *'Dôka' no dôsôimu* (Tokyo: Sangensha, forthcoming 2000).
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[57] Gotô, *Taiwanshi*, 818.
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[59] Thomas Barclay, *The Church in Formosa in 1895, the War: Mission Work: The Outlook* (London: Publication Committee, 1896), 3–5 (The Presbyterian Church of England Archives, Microfishe No.153, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London; hereafter cited as PCEA Microfiche No. 153).
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[61] We Wenxing, *Rijishuji Taiwan shehui lingdao jiecheng zhi yanju* (Taipei, Zengzhong shuju, 1992), 141.
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[63] Robert Miles, *Racism after "Race Relations"* (London: Routledge, 1993), 63.
[64] Michael Weiner, *Race and Migration in Imperial Japan* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 11.
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[66] Kumamoto Shigekichi, "Taiwan ni okeru kyôiku ni taisuru hibun no ichi ni nami ni gimon" [A few questions regarding education in Taiwan] (Tokyo daigaku kyôyô gakubu shozô Kumamoto Shigekichi monjo, 0102).
[67] Letter of Barclay to Maclagan, March 21, 1912, PCEA, Microfiche No. 2033.
[68] "Kôritsu Taichung chûgakkô setchi mondai," Kumamoto Shigekichi monjo, 0301.
[69] "Kôritsu Taichung chûgakkô setchi mondai."
[70] On reforms of the colonial regime in the early 1920s, see Haruyama Meitetsu, "Kindai Nihon no shokuminchi tôchi to Hara Takashi" [Modern Japanese colonial rule and Hara Takashi], in *Nihon shokuminchishugi no seijiteki tenkai*, ed. Wakabayashi Masahiro and Haruyama Meitetsu (Tokyo: Ajia Keizai Gakkai, 1980). The expression "new concept in colonial rule" is Haruyama's.
[71] E. Band, "Report of the Presbyterian Middle School Tainan, Formosa," 1924, PCEA Microfiche No. 153–154.
[72] Li Xiao-feng, *Lim Bo-seng Chen Jin he tamen de shidai*, (Taipei: Yushan chubansha, 1996), 18–28.

[73] "Tainan Changlaojiao zhongxue de jibenjin ji muji shiwan yuan," *Taiwan minbao*, No.113 (July 1926).
[74] "Shiritsu Tainan chôrôkyô chûgaku zaidan hôjin kifu kôi," *Shiritsu Tainan chôrôkyô chûgakkô yûkai zasshi* 4 (1927).
[75] Mosei Lin, *Public Education in Formosa under the Japanese Administration; A Historical Study of the Development and the Cultural Problems* (New York, 1929), 168.
[76] E. Band, "The Educational Situation in Formosa," *The Japan Mission Yearbook*, ed. Paul S. Mayer (Tokyo: The Meiji Press, 1929).
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[79] F. Healey, "The New Generation in Formosa," *Presbyterian Messenger* 1041 (December 1931).
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[81] Hugh Macmillan, *Then Till Now in Formosa* (London: English and Canadian Presbyterian Church in Formosa, 1953), 90.
[82] E. Band, "The Educational Situation in Formosa," *The Japan Mission Yearbook*, ed. Paul S. Mayer (Tokyo: The Meiji Press, 1929), 274. Previous studies of the shrine worship problem at Tainan Presbyterian Middle School include Cha shijie, "Huangminhua yundong xia de Taiwan Changlaojiaohui" in *Zhongguo Haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji* (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan sanminzhuyu yanjiusuo, 1988), Zhang Hou-ji, *Tainan Changrong Zhongxue bainian si* (Tainan: Tainan sili Changrong zhongxue gaoji zhongxue, 1991); Hamish Ion, *The Cross and the Rising Sun 2: The British Missionary Movement in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 1865–1945* (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1993). Those by Ion and Zhang Hou-ji are especially rich in a documentary sense and were valuable references for the present study. Nevertheless, a comprehensive study that employs English, Chinese, and Japanese sources so as to present a multilayered account of the facts of the issue remains to be written.
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[84] L. Singleton, "Objections to Shrine Attendance," October 1934 (PCEA, Microfiche No. 19).
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[86] Edward Band, "Tainan Presbyterian Middle School 1934" (PCEA Microfiche No. 20).
[87] *Taiwan nichi nichi shinpô*, February 28, 1934.
[88] *Taiwan shinpô*, March 2, 1934.
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[90] *Taiwan nichi nichi shinpô*, March 5 and 6, 1934.
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[100] Lin Zong-yi, "Wo de fuqin Lim Bo-seng," 17.
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